- Added two (SPORE) splice-AS variants.
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spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl
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66
spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl
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usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol spliceAShcCJ(C,AS,S)
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{
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role C
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{
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const N1,N2: Nonce;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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const L: LifeTime;
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send_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 );
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read_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
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send_3(C,S, C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
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read_6(S,C, S, C, {N2}pk(C) );
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claim_7(C, Secret, N2);
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claim_9(C, Niagree);
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claim_10(C, Nisynch);
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}
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role AS
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{
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var N1,N3: Nonce;
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read_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 );
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send_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
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read_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 );
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send_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
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}
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role S
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{
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const N3: Nonce;
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var N2: Nonce;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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var L: LifeTime;
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_3(C,S, C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
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send_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 );
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read_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
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send_6(S,C, S, C, {N2}pk(C) );
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claim_8(S, Secret, N2);
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claim_11(S, Niagree);
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claim_12(S, Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run spliceAShcCJ.C(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAShcCJ.AS(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAShcCJ.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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66
spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl
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66
spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
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usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol spliceAShc(C,AS,S)
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{
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role C
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{
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const N1,N2: Nonce;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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const L: LifeTime;
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send_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 );
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read_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
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send_3(C,S, C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
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read_6(S,C, S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) );
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claim_7(C, Secret, N2);
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claim_9(C, Niagree);
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claim_10(C, Nisynch);
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}
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role AS
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{
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var N1,N3: Nonce;
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read_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 );
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send_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
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read_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 );
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send_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
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}
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role S
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{
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const N3: Nonce;
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var N2: Nonce;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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var L: LifeTime;
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_3(C,S, C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
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send_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 );
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read_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
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send_6(S,C, S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) );
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claim_8(S, Secret, N2);
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claim_11(S, Niagree);
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claim_12(S, Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run spliceAShc.C(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAShc.AS(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAShc.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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