From 29445bbd5f8e39e89e5b84f4383810118493da47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ccremers Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2004 14:50:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] - Added two (SPORE) splice-AS variants. --- spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl create mode 100644 spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl diff --git a/spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl b/spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1463e61 --- /dev/null +++ b/spdl/splice-as-hc-cj.spdl @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; + +const pk: Function; +secret sk: Function; +inversekeys (pk,sk); + +protocol spliceAShcCJ(C,AS,S) +{ + role C + { + const N1,N2: Nonce; + const T: TimeStamp; + const L: LifeTime; + + send_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 ); + read_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) ); + send_3(C,S, C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) ); + read_6(S,C, S, C, {N2}pk(C) ); + + claim_7(C, Secret, N2); + claim_9(C, Niagree); + claim_10(C, Nisynch); + } + + role AS + { + var N1,N3: Nonce; + + read_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 ); + send_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) ); + read_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 ); + send_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) ); + } + + role S + { + const N3: Nonce; + var N2: Nonce; + var T: TimeStamp; + var L: LifeTime; + + var ni: Nonce; + const nr: Nonce; + + read_3(C,S, C, S, {T, L, {C, N2}pk(S)}sk(C) ); + send_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 ); + read_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) ); + send_6(S,C, S, C, {N2}pk(C) ); + + claim_8(S, Secret, N2); + claim_11(S, Niagree); + claim_12(S, Nisynch); + } +} + +const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent; + +untrusted Eve; +const ne: Nonce; +compromised sk(Eve); + +run spliceAShcCJ.C(Agent,Agent,Agent); +run spliceAShcCJ.AS(Agent,Agent,Agent); +run spliceAShcCJ.S(Agent,Agent,Agent); + + diff --git a/spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl b/spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2bf6d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/spdl/splice-as-hc.spdl @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; + +const pk: Function; +secret sk: Function; +inversekeys (pk,sk); + +protocol spliceAShc(C,AS,S) +{ + role C + { + const N1,N2: Nonce; + const T: TimeStamp; + const L: LifeTime; + + send_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 ); + read_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) ); + send_3(C,S, C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) ); + read_6(S,C, S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) ); + + claim_7(C, Secret, N2); + claim_9(C, Niagree); + claim_10(C, Nisynch); + } + + role AS + { + var N1,N3: Nonce; + + read_1(C,AS, C, S, N1 ); + send_2(AS,C, AS, {AS, C, N1, S, pk(S)}sk(AS) ); + read_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 ); + send_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) ); + } + + role S + { + const N3: Nonce; + var N2: Nonce; + var T: TimeStamp; + var L: LifeTime; + + var ni: Nonce; + const nr: Nonce; + + read_3(C,S, C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) ); + send_4(S,AS, S, C, N3 ); + read_5(AS,S, AS, {AS, S, N3, C, pk(C)}sk(AS) ); + send_6(S,C, S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) ); + + claim_8(S, Secret, N2); + claim_11(S, Niagree); + claim_12(S, Nisynch); + } +} + +const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent; + +untrusted Eve; +const ne: Nonce; +compromised sk(Eve); + +run spliceAShc.C(Agent,Agent,Agent); +run spliceAShc.AS(Agent,Agent,Agent); +run spliceAShc.S(Agent,Agent,Agent); + +