59 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
59 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
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/*
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* This is a model of a version of the four-way handshake protocol as modeled
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* by He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
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* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
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*/
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#define ptk hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y )
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
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usertype Params, String;
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const hash: Function;
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secret unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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secret pmk: Function;
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const msg1,msg2,msg3,msg4: String;
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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protocol fourway(X,Y)
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{
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role X
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{
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const x: Nonce;
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var y: Nonce;
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send_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
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read_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( ptk,y,msg2 ) );
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send_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( ptk,x,msg3 ) );
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read_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( ptk,msg4 ) );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, ptk );
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claim_X2( X, Niagree );
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}
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role Y
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{
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var x: Nonce;
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const y: Nonce;
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read_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
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send_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( ptk,y,msg2 ) );
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read_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( ptk,x,msg3 ) );
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send_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( ptk,msg4 ) );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, ptk );
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claim_Y2( Y, Niagree );
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}
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}
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised pmk(Eve,Alice);
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compromised pmk(Eve,Bob);
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compromised pmk(Alice,Eve);
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compromised pmk(Bob,Eve);
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