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- Added Mitchell et al fourway protocol.

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ccremers 2006-11-21 16:31:15 +00:00
parent 45dbcfad21
commit 4c469c542b
2 changed files with 111 additions and 0 deletions
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58
spdl/misc/fourway-HSDDM05.cpp Normal file
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/*
* This is a model of a version of the four-way handshake protocol as modeled
* by He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
*/
#define ptk hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y )
/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
usertype Params, String;
const hash: Function;
secret unhash: Function;
inversekeys(hash,unhash);
secret pmk: Function;
const msg1,msg2,msg3,msg4: String;
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
protocol fourway(X,Y)
{
role X
{
const x: Nonce;
var y: Nonce;
send_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
read_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( ptk,y,msg2 ) );
send_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( ptk,x,msg3 ) );
read_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( ptk,msg4 ) );
claim_X1( X, Secret, ptk );
claim_X2( X, Niagree );
}
role Y
{
var x: Nonce;
const y: Nonce;
read_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
send_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( ptk,y,msg2 ) );
read_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( ptk,x,msg3 ) );
send_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( ptk,msg4 ) );
claim_Y1( Y, Secret, ptk );
claim_Y2( Y, Niagree );
}
}
untrusted Eve;
compromised pmk(Eve,Alice);
compromised pmk(Eve,Bob);
compromised pmk(Alice,Eve);
compromised pmk(Bob,Eve);

53
spdl/misc/fourway-HSDDM05.spdl Normal file
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# 1 "fourway-HSDDM05.cpp"
# 1 "<built-in>"
# 1 "<command line>"
# 1 "fourway-HSDDM05.cpp"
# 10 "fourway-HSDDM05.cpp"
usertype Params, String;
const hash: Function;
secret unhash: Function;
inversekeys(hash,unhash);
secret pmk: Function;
const msg1,msg2,msg3,msg4: String;
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
protocol fourway(X,Y)
{
role X
{
const x: Nonce;
var y: Nonce;
send_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
read_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),y,msg2 ) );
send_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),x,msg3 ) );
read_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),msg4 ) );
claim_X1( X, Secret, hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ) );
claim_X2( X, Niagree );
}
role Y
{
var x: Nonce;
const y: Nonce;
read_1( X,Y, x,msg1 );
send_2( Y,X, y,msg2,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),y,msg2 ) );
read_3( X,Y, x,msg3,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),x,msg3 ) );
send_4( Y,X, msg4,hash( hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ),msg4 ) );
claim_Y1( Y, Secret, hash( pmk(X,Y),x,y ) );
claim_Y2( Y, Niagree );
}
}
untrusted Eve;
compromised pmk(Eve,Alice);
compromised pmk(Eve,Bob);
compromised pmk(Alice,Eve);
compromised pmk(Bob,Eve);