- Add session compromise to all protocols that establish a session key

This commit is contained in:
gijs
2005-06-24 10:53:15 +00:00
parent 658f4f392a
commit 6fb6aa33dd
23 changed files with 552 additions and 17 deletions

View File

@@ -8,10 +8,37 @@
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
#
usertype Sessionkey;
usertype SessionKey;
usertype Timestamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
protocol kaochow3SessionKeyCompromise(C)
{
// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
role C {
const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
const Kir,Kt: SessionKey;
const T2: Timestamp;
var I,R,S: Agent;
read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
send_C2(C,C, (I,R,Ni),
{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(I,S),
{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
{Ni,Kir}Kt,
Nr,
{I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
{Nr,Kir}Kt,
Kir,
Kt
);
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
}
}
protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
{
@@ -19,11 +46,11 @@ protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
var kir,kt: SessionKey;
var T2: Ticket;
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
@@ -36,12 +63,12 @@ protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
var kir,kt: SessionKey;
var T: Ticket;
const tr: Timestamp;
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
@@ -53,7 +80,7 @@ protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
role S
{
var ni: Nonce;
const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
const kir, kt: SessionKey;
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
@@ -65,7 +92,7 @@ const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: Sessionkey;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);