scyther/gui/Protocols/IKE/ikev1-sig-m-perlman.cpp
Cas Cremers 34d7cba293 Added IKE base models.
Modelers: Adrian Kyburz and Cas Cremers
2012-11-15 11:48:14 +01:00

101 lines
2.5 KiB
C++

/**********************************************************************
* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv1)
* @reference RFC 2409,
* Boyd C. and Mathuria A., Protocols for Authentication
* and Key Agreement
* @variant Digital signature authentication (aggressive mode) with
* a modification suggested by Perlman et al.
**********************************************************************/
/**
* MACRO DEFINITIONS
* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
*/
#define __IKEV1__
#ifndef __ORACLE__
#include "common.h"
#endif
#define SKEYIDi prf(Ni,Nr,Zi)
#define SKEYIDr prf(Ni,Nr,Zr)
#define HASH_Ii prf(Ni, Nr, Zi, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr, list, I)
#define HASH_Ir prf(Ni, Nr, Zr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr, list, I)
#define HASH_Ri prf(Ni, Nr, Zi, Gr, g(i), Cr, Ci, list, R)
#define HASH_Rr prf(Ni, Nr, Zr, g(r), Gi, Cr, Ci, list, R)
usertype String;
const list, algo: String;
/**
* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
*/
protocol @executability(O) {
#define Gi g(i)
#define Gr g(r)
role O {
var i, r, Ni, Nr, Ci, Cr: Nonce;
var I, R: Agent;
// msg 4
recv_!O1( O, O, {R, {HASH_Rr}sk(R)}SKr );
send_!O2( O, O, {R, {HASH_Ri}sk(R)}SKi );
// msg 5
recv_!O3( O, O, {I, {HASH_Ii}sk(I)}SKi );
send_!O4( O, O, {I, {HASH_Ir}sk(I)}SKr );
}
#undef Gi
#undef Gr
}
protocol ikev1-sig-m-perlman(I, R)
{
role I {
fresh i, Ni, Ci: Nonce;
var Nr, Cr: Nonce;
var Gr: Ticket;
send_1( I, R, Ci, list );
recv_2( R, I, Ci, Cr, algo );
send_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, g(i), Ni );
recv_!4( R, I, Ci, Cr, Gr, Nr, {R, {HASH_Ri}sk(R)}SKi );
claim( I, Running, R, Ni, Nr, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr );
send_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, {I, {HASH_Ii}sk(I)}SKi );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( I, SKR, SKi );
claim( I, Alive );
claim( I, Weakagree );
claim( I, Commit, R, Ni, Nr, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr );
}
role R {
fresh r, Nr, Cr: Nonce;
var Ni, Ci: Nonce;
var Gi: Ticket;
recv_1( I, R, Ci, list );
send_2( R, I, Ci, Cr, algo );
recv_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, Gi, Ni );
claim( R, Running, I, Ni, Nr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr );
send_!4( R, I, Ci, Cr, g(r), Nr, {R, {HASH_Rr}sk(R)}SKr );
recv_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, {I, {HASH_Ir}sk(I)}SKr );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( R, SKR, SKr );
claim( R, Alive );
claim( R, Weakagree );
claim( R, Commit, I, Ni, Nr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr );
}
}