scyther/src/notes.txt
ccremers 4d7b744e1b - Discovered ugly bit in de-class code, which causes what seem to be
errors with --extravert: even if Alice is already occurring in the
  system, the name can be used.
- Added explicit level 2 encryption bound. This is technically
  incorrect, but for now it should work.
2006-03-31 10:12:58 +00:00

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- De-classification does not work as desired. The name Alice is used
even if it already occurs somehwere in the system, which is not what
we want.
- Heuristic could also punish more initiators.
- If no attack/state output is needed, maybe the attack heuristic should
be simpler (which means just weighting the trace length etc.) in order
to avoid uneccesary continuation of the search. Maybe even stop
altogether after finding *an* attack.
- For the TimeStamps etc, we can implement an 'auto-leak' of such local
constants. This should works also with a modifier of sorts (e.g.
'predictable') and such constants should be leaked to the intruder at
the start of the run, possibly by prefixing a send.
- The trace incremental search should start at something like 'distance of
first claim + SOMECONST * runs'. SOMECONST relates to the partial-order
induced trace prolonings.
- For now, CLP is non-working and not checked. Reconsider this later.
- Because the properties checked are related to the partial order reductions,
it makes sense to check 'all secrecy claims' or 'all synchronisation claims'
at once.
- Given originator assumptions and such, we might want to implement the
compiler, that for non-typed matching, it will ignore all type definitions
in the code (as in, putting them in stype, but still considering Function).
Then, for 'any agent' we can use stype silently. The modelchecker should
then always consider the types with -m0 and -m1.
- In a paper concerning the CASRUL compiler, they mention associativity for
the equality relations. Note that CASRUL restricts the intruder actions,
and sometimes uses approximations.
- MS and CE never mention associativity as a restriction.
- For now, clp stuff will use pairing and simple mgu. Maybe a -m3 switch will
add the associative variant later.
- MALLOC_TRACE is the environment variable that triggers mtrace() output.
- Several memory leak detectors are still in place, they can all be located by
searching for "lead" or "diff" and destroying the code.
- knowledgeAddTerm might be improved by scanning through key list only with
things that are newly added.
- Associativity and unification don't play together well; consider other
algorithms. Maybe a simple explore (x,y),z and explore x,(y,z) will do, e.g.
take any split point for both sequences.
- POR (-t3) is actually worse than -t2: sends first. After some pondering I
now know why. It's because simultaneous reads yield traces in which there
are attacks that are also in the ones where we have R0S0S0;R1 (i.e. is thus
equivalent with R0;R1;S0S0)
- Knowledge is monotonous. So, if we say 'R#0' cannot be triggered by some
knowledge, we can just use a pointer for it. If we do want to trigger it, we
need to compare two knowledge pointers. As they don't have a unique
representation, it is more difficult. For now, I will just forbid specific
branches of the read when a message is in some previous knowledge, which is
more precise.
- Comparisons with Casper are in order.
- It is a good idea to have any number of input files, and parse them all, to
combine scenarios. A command should be "require <file>", because that would
enable scenarios to load the required role definitions. It's require instead
of include, because of possible multiple occurrences.