0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
119 lines
2.9 KiB
Plaintext
119 lines
2.9 KiB
Plaintext
# Lowe modified KSL
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kslLowe.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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# Note:
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# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
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# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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compromised k(e,s);
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protocol ksl-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr,Nc,Ma,Mb: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
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(Ni,I,Nr,R),
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{I,Nr,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{R,Ni}k(I,R),
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{Nc}Kir,
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Ma,
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Mb,{Ma,R}Kir,
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{I,Mb}Kir,
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Kir,
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Kbb
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kbb));
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}
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}
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protocol ksl-Lowe(A,B,S)
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{
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role A
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{
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const Na, Ma: Nonce;
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var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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send_1(A,B, Na, A);
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read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {B,Na}Kab );
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send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
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send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
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read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma, B}Kab );
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send_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
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claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
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claim_A4(A,Empty, (Fresh,Kab));
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}
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role B
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{
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var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tb: TimeStamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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read_1(A,B, Na, A);
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send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
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read_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), T );
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send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab );
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read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
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read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
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send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma,B}Kab );
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read_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
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claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
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claim_B2(B,Niagree);
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claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
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claim_B4(B,Empty, (Fresh,Kab));
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}
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role S
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{
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var Na, Nb: Nonce;
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const Kab: SessionKey;
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read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
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send_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
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}
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}
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run ksl-Lowe.A(a,b,s);
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run ksl-Lowe.B(a,b,s);
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run ksl-Lowe.S(a,b,s);
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