89 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
89 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
# Buttyan Nagy Vajda protocol 2 (3-party)
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the paper
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# "Efficient multi-party challenge-response protocols for entity
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# authentication"
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#
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# Attacks:
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#
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secret k: Function;
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protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
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{
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role Swap
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{
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var T: Ticket;
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var R0,R1: Agent;
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read_1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
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send_2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
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}
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}
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protocol bunava23(R0,R1,R2)
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{
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role R0
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{
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const n0: Nonce;
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var n1,n2: Nonce;
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var T0: Ticket;
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send_1(R0,R1, n0);
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read_3(R2,R0, n2, T0, { R2,{ R1,n0 }k(R0,R1) }k(R0,R2) );
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send_4(R0,R1, { R0,n2 }k(R0,R2), { R0, T0 }k(R0,R1) );
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claim_A1(R0, Niagree);
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claim_A2(R0, Nisynch);
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}
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role R1
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{
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const n1: Nonce;
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var n0,n2: Nonce;
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var T1: Ticket;
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read_1(R0,R1, n0);
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send_2(R1,R2, n1,{R1,n0}k(R1,R2) );
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read_4(R0,R1, T1, { R0, { R2,n1 }k(R1,R2) }k(R0,R1) );
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send_5(R1,R2, { R1, T1 }k(R1,R2) );
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claim_B1(R1, Niagree);
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claim_B2(R1, Nisynch);
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}
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role R2
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{
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const n2: Nonce;
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var n0,n1: Nonce;
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var T2: Ticket;
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read_2(R1,R2, n1, T2 );
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send_3(R2,R0, n2,{ R2,n1 }k(R1,R2), { R2, T2 }k(R0,R2) );
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read_5(R1,R2, { R1, { R0,n2 }k(R0,R2) }k(R1,R2) );
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claim_C1(R2, Niagree);
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claim_C2(R2, Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Charlie,David,Frodo,Gerard,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised k(Alice,Eve);
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compromised k(Bob,Eve);
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compromised k(Charlie,Eve);
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compromised k(Eve,Alice);
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compromised k(Eve,Bob);
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compromised k(Eve,Charlie);
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# General scenario
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run bunava23.R0(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run bunava23.R1(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run bunava23.R2(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run bunava23.R0(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run bunava23.R1(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run bunava23.R2(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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