0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
107 lines
2.4 KiB
Plaintext
107 lines
2.4 KiB
Plaintext
# Woo and Lam Mutual Authentication
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamMutual.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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protocol woolam^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const N1,N2: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, I,N1,
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R,N2,
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{I,R,N1,N2}k(I,S),
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{I,R,N1,N2}k(R,S),
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{R,N1,N2,Kir}k(I,S),
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{I,N1,N2,Kir}k(R,S),
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{N1,N2}Kir,
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{N2}Kir,
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Kir
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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}
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}
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protocol woolam(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const N1: Nonce;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var N2: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I, N1);
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read_2(R,I, R, N2);
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send_3(I,R, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S));
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read_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
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send_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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const N2: Nonce;
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var N1: Nonce;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T1,T2: Ticket;
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read_1(I,R, I, N1);
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send_2(R,I, R, N2);
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read_3(I,R, T1);
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send_4(R,S, T1, {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
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read_5(S,R, T2, {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
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send_6(R,I, T2, {N1,N2}Kir);
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read_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var N1,N2: Nonce;
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read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
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send_5(S,R, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: SessionKey;
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const Te: Ticket;
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const Ne: Nonce;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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run woolam.I (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run woolam.R (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run woolam.S (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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