scyther/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-1c.spdl
gijs 0f54f2ed23 - Update modeling of needham schroeder to better reflect the modelling in
SPORE:
    - pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
    - Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
    - For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
      protocolname-variant^subprotocol
    For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
    protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
2005-08-15 13:31:48 +00:00

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# CCITT X.509 (1c)
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/ccittx509_1c.html
#
# Note:
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol
#
const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys (hash,unhash);
inversekeys(pk,sk);
usertype Timestamp;
protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R)
{
role I
{
const Ta: Timestamp;
const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
}
role R
{
var Ta: Timestamp;
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
claim_3(R,Nisynch);
# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Timestamp;
compromised sk(Eve);
# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
run ccitt509-1c.I(Agent,Agent);
run ccitt509-1c.R(Agent,Agent);
run ccitt509-1c.I(Agent,Agent);
run ccitt509-1c.R(Agent,Agent);