scyther/protocols/SPORE/andrew.spdl
2007-05-17 17:28:10 +02:00

86 lines
2.0 KiB
Plaintext

# Andrew Secure RPC
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/andrew.html
#
# Note:
# The shared key between I and R is modelled as k(I,R) currently
# there is no way to express that this key is equal to k(R,I)
# So it is possile that certain attacks that use this property are not found
#
usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const succ: Function;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
protocol andrew^KeyCompromise(C)
{
// Read the names of 2 agents and disclose a session between them including
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
role C {
const ni,nr,nr2: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey;
var I,R: Agent;
read_!C1(C,C, I,R);
send_!C2(C,C, (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
{succ(ni),nr}k(I,R),
{succ(nr)}k(I,R),
{kir,nr2}k(I,R),
kir
);
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,kir));
}
}
protocol andrew(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr,nr2: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey;
send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
claim_I3(I,Niagree);
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr,nr2: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
claim_R3(R,Niagree);
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);