727e813c77
Not everything is fixed yet. However, we fixed: - 'const' -> 'fresh' - Removed lines specifying 'runs' - Removed some specifications of compromised Eve and its long-term keys being compromised.
74 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
74 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
/*
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* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
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* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
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* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
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*
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* This is the fixed version, with quite some differences:
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*
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* 1) new definition of handShake1 (including preceding tuples)
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* 2) new definition of both handshakes (now hashed)
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* 3) changed order in msg3 so msecret is part of handShake1
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*
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* (These are the suggestions made by Cas to Anupam Datta)
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*/
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define(`CERTY',`{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence)')
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define(`CERTX',`{ X,pk(X) }sk(Terence)')
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define(`msg1',`X,Nx,pa')
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define(`msg2',`Ny,pb,CERTY')
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define(`handShake1',`hash(msg1,msg2,{msecret}pk(Y))')
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define(`msg3',`CERTX,{msecret}pk(Y),{handShake1}sk(X),hash(msecret,handShake1,clientstring)')
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define(`handShake2',`hash(msg1,msg2,msg3)')
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define(`msg4',`hash(msecret,handShake2,serverstring)')
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
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usertype Params, String;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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const clientstring,serverstring: String;
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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const Terence: Agent;
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protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
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{
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role X
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{
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fresh Nx: Nonce;
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fresh msecret: Nonce;
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fresh pa: Params;
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var Ny: Nonce;
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var pb: Params;
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send_1( X,Y, msg1 );
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read_2( Y,X, msg2 );
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send_3( X,Y, msg3 );
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read_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
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}
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role Y
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{
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var Nx: Nonce;
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var msecret: Nonce;
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var pa: Params;
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fresh Ny: Nonce;
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fresh pb: Params;
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read_1( X,Y, msg1 );
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send_2( Y,X, msg2 );
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read_3( X,Y, msg3 );
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send_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
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}
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}
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