727e813c77
Not everything is fixed yet. However, we fixed: - 'const' -> 'fresh' - Removed lines specifying 'runs' - Removed some specifications of compromised Eve and its long-term keys being compromised.
61 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
61 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Macseed;
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const m: Function;
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secret unm: Function;
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const f: Function;
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inversekeys (m, unm);
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/*
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* Boyd key agreement
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*
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* Boyd & Mathuria: Protocols for authentication and key establishment
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* (2003) p. 101
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*
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* Note that MAC_ks(x) has been interpreted as MAC(x,ks); this
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* assumption causes some possible false attacks.
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*/
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protocol boyd(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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fresh ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var ks: Macseed;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R, ni );
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read_3 (R,I, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), m(ni, m(ks,ni,nr)), nr );
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send_4 (I,R, m(nr, m(ks,ni,nr)) );
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claim_6 (I, Secret, m(ks,ni,nr) );
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claim_7 (I, Niagree);
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claim_8 (I, Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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fresh nr: Nonce;
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var ks: Macseed;
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read_2 (S,R, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), { I,R, ks }k(R,S), ni );
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send_3 (R,I, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), m(ni, m(ks,ni,nr)), nr );
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read_4 (I,R, m(nr, m(ks,ni,nr)) );
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claim_10 (R, Secret, m(ks,ni,nr));
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claim_11 (R, Niagree);
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claim_12 (R, Nisynch);
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}
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role S
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{
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var ni,nr: Nonce;
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fresh ks: Macseed;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R, ni );
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send_2 (S,R, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), { I,R, ks }k(R,S), ni );
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}
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}
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