0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
99 lines
2.4 KiB
Plaintext
99 lines
2.4 KiB
Plaintext
# Andrew Secure RPC
|
|
#
|
|
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
|
|
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/andrew.html
|
|
#
|
|
# Note:
|
|
# The shared key between I and R is modelled as k(I,R) currently
|
|
# there is no way to express that this key is equal to k(R,I)
|
|
# So it is possile that certain attacks that use this property are not found
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
usertype SessionKey;
|
|
secret k: Function;
|
|
const succ: Function;
|
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
|
const Compromised: Function;
|
|
|
|
protocol andrew^KeyCompromise(C)
|
|
{
|
|
// Read the names of 2 agents and disclose a session between them including
|
|
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
|
|
role C {
|
|
const ni,nr,nr2: Nonce;
|
|
const kir: SessionKey;
|
|
var I,R: Agent;
|
|
|
|
read_C1(C,C, I,R);
|
|
send_C2(C,C, (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
|
|
{succ(ni),nr}k(I,R),
|
|
{succ(nr)}k(I,R),
|
|
{kir,nr2}k(I,R),
|
|
kir
|
|
);
|
|
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,kir));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
protocol andrew(I,R)
|
|
{
|
|
role I
|
|
{
|
|
const ni: Nonce;
|
|
var nr,nr2: Nonce;
|
|
var kir: SessionKey;
|
|
|
|
send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
|
read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
|
|
send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
|
|
read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
|
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
|
|
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
|
claim_I3(I,Niagree);
|
|
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
role R
|
|
{
|
|
var ni: Nonce;
|
|
const nr,nr2: Nonce;
|
|
const kir: SessionKey;
|
|
|
|
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
|
send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
|
|
read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
|
|
send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
|
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
|
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
|
claim_R3(R,Niagree);
|
|
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
|
|
|
|
untrusted Eve;
|
|
const ne: Nonce;
|
|
const kee: SessionKey;
|
|
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
|
|
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
|
|
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
|
|
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
|
|
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# This scenario should recreate the first attack in SPORE when running
|
|
# scyther in model checker mode
|
|
#run andrew.I(Alice,Bob);
|
|
#run andrew.R(Alice,Bob);
|
|
#run andrew.I(Alice,Bob);
|
|
#run andrew.R(Alice,Bob);
|
|
|
|
# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
|
|
|
|
run andrew.I(Agent,Agent);
|
|
run andrew.R(Agent,Agent);
|
|
run andrew.I(Agent,Agent);
|
|
run andrew.R(Agent,Agent);
|