scyther/testing/protocols/misc/nst1.spdl

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# Neumann Stubblebine
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/neumannStubblebine.html
#
# Note:
# In SPORE this protocol is not described correctly, there are in fact 2
# different protocols (the key establishment protocol and the repeated
# authentication protocol)
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
const kee: SessionKey;
protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey;
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
recv_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
send_!chain(I,R, { R,Tb,Kir }k(I,S), T);
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role R
{
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey;
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket;
fresh g: Ticket;
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, g}k(R,S),Nr);
recv_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
claim_R5(R,Secret, g);
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role S
{
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp;
var g: Ticket;
recv_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb, g}k(R,S), Nr);
send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
}
}