75 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
75 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
# Buttyan Nagy Vajda protocol 1 (3-party)
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the paper
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# "Efficient multi-party challenge-response protocols for entity
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# authentication"
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#
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# Attacks:
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# Does not satisfy ni-agree, because when Alice in the R0 role terminates
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# it cannot be sure that the agent in role R1 is aware of having sent a
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# reply for Alice.
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# R0 type flaw attack exists in which there are only two agents active.
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#
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secret k: Function;
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protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
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{
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role Swap
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{
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var T: Ticket;
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var R0,R1: Agent;
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recv_!1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
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send_!2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
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}
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}
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protocol bunava13(R0,R1,R2)
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{
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role R0
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{
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fresh n0: Nonce;
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var n1,n2: Nonce;
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send_1(R0,R1, n0);
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recv_3(R2,R0, n2,{R2,n1,R1,n0}k(R0,R2) );
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send_4(R0,R1, {R0,n2,R2,n1}k(R0,R1) );
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claim_A1(R0, Niagree);
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claim_A2(R0, Nisynch);
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}
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role R1
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{
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fresh n1: Nonce;
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var n0,n2: Nonce;
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recv_1(R0,R1, n0);
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send_2(R1,R2, n1,{R1,n0}k(R1,R2) );
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recv_4(R0,R1, {R0,n2,R2,n1}k(R0,R1) );
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send_5(R1,R2, {R1,R0,n2}k(R1,R2) );
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claim_B1(R1, Niagree);
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claim_B2(R1, Nisynch);
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}
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role R2
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{
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fresh n2: Nonce;
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var n0,n1: Nonce;
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recv_2(R1,R2, n1,{R1,n0}k(R1,R2) );
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send_3(R2,R0, n2,{R2,n1,R1,n0}k(R0,R2) );
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recv_5(R1,R2, {R1,R0,n2}k(R1,R2) );
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claim_C1(R2, Niagree);
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claim_C2(R2, Nisynch);
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}
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}
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# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
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