0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
113 lines
2.7 KiB
Plaintext
113 lines
2.7 KiB
Plaintext
# Hwang modified Neumann Stubblebine
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/neumannStubblebineHwang.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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# Note:
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# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
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# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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compromised k(e,s);
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protocol neustub-Hwang^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr,Mi,Mr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, I,Ni,
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R,{I,Ni,Tr,Nr}k(R,S),
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{R,Ni,Kir,Tr}k(I,S),
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{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S), Nr,
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{Nr}Kir,
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Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S),
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Mr,{Mr}Kir,
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{Mr}Kir,
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Kir
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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}
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}
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protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
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var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
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send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
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const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Tb: TimeStamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, Nr}k(R,S));
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read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
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read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
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send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
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}
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}
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run neustub-Hwang.A(a,b,s);
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run neustub-Hwang.B(a,b,s);
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run neustub-Hwang.S(a,b,s);
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