0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
111 lines
2.7 KiB
Plaintext
111 lines
2.7 KiB
Plaintext
# Kao Chow Authentication v.3
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kaoChow3.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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protocol kaochow-3^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir,Kt: SessionKey;
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const T2: ExpiredTimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, (I,R,Ni),
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{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(I,S),
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{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
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{Ni,Kir}Kt,
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Nr,
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{I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
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{Nr,Kir}Kt,
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Kir
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// Kt
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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// claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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}
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}
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protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: SessionKey;
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var T2: Ticket;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
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claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_I2 (I, Niagree);
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claim_I3 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I4 (I, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: SessionKey;
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var T: Ticket;
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const tr: TimeStamp;
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read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
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claim_R3 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R4 (R, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const kir, kt: SessionKey;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const te: Ticket;
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const ke: SessionKey;
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compromised k(Eve,Eve);
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compromised k(Eve,Alice);
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compromised k(Eve,Bob);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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compromised k(Alice,Eve);
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compromised k(Bob,Eve);
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compromised k(Simon,Eve);
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run kaochow-3.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow-3.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow-3.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow-3.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow-3.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow-3.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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