0f54f2ed23
SPORE:
- pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
- Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
- For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
protocolname-variant^subprotocol
For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
98 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
98 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
# Denning-Sacco shared key
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/denningSacco.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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protocol denningSacco^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: ExpiredTimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, (I,R),
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{R,Kir,T,{Kir,I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
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{Kir,I,T}k(R,S),
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Kir
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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}
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}
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Secret,Kir);
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claim_I4(I,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
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claim_R4(R,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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const tee: TimeStamp;
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
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# Note because the modelchecker does not support tickets this might not
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# be very useful
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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