47 lines
1018 B
Plaintext
47 lines
1018 B
Plaintext
# CCITT X.509 (1)
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/ccittx509_1.html
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#
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# Note:
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# The attack in SPORE is not found as this is not an attack against
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# synchronisation, but an attack against the freshness of Xa and Ya
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# which can currently not be modelled in scyther
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#
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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usertype Timestamp;
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protocol ccitt509-1(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
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# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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claim_3(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const te: Timestamp;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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