scyther/gui/Protocols/neumannstub-keycompromise.spdl
2007-05-19 17:10:46 +02:00

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# Neumann Stubblebine
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/neumannStubblebine.html
#
# Note:
# In SPORE this protocol is not described correctly, there are in fact 2
# different protocols (the key establishment protocol and the repeated
# authentication protocol)
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
protocol neustub^KeyCompromise(C)
{
// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
role C {
const Ni,Nr,Mi,Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
var I,R,S: Agent;
read_!C1(C,C, I,R,S);
send_!C2(C,C, I,Ni,
R,{I,Ni,Tr}k(R,S),Nr,
{R,Ni,Kir,Tr}k(I,S),
{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S), Nr,
{Nr}Kir,
Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S),
Mr,{Mi}Kir,
{Mr}Kir,
Kir
);
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
}
}
protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
{
const Kir: SessionKey;
role I
{
const Mi: Nonce;
var Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp;
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role R
{
const Mr: Nonce;
var Tr: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey;
var Mi: Nonce;
read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role S
{
}
}
protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey;
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role R
{
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
}
role S
{
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
}
}