scyther/testing/tls/tls-HSDDM05-fix.cpp

73 lines
1.5 KiB
C++

/*
* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
*
* This is the fixed version, with quite some differences:
*
* 1) new definition of handShake1
* 2) changed order in msg3
*
* (These are the suggestions made by Cas to Anupam Datta)
*/
#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
#define msg1 X,Nx,pa
#define msg2 Ny,pb,CERT(Y)
#define handShake1 msg1,msg2,{msecret}pk(Y)
#define msg3 CERT(X),{msecret}pk(Y),{handShake1}sk(X),hash(msecret,handShake1,clientstring)
#define handShake2 msg1,msg2,msg3
#define msg4 hash(msecret,handShake2,serverstring)
/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
usertype Params, String;
const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
inversekeys(hash,unhash);
const clientstring,serverstring: String;
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
const Terence: Agent;
protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
{
role X
{
fresh Nx: Nonce;
fresh msecret: Nonce;
fresh pa: Params;
var Ny: Nonce;
var pb: Params;
send_1( X,Y, msg1 );
recv_2( Y,X, msg2 );
send_3( X,Y, msg3 );
recv_4( Y,X, msg4 );
claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
}
role Y
{
var Nx: Nonce;
var msecret: Nonce;
var pa: Params;
fresh Ny: Nonce;
fresh pb: Params;
recv_1( X,Y, msg1 );
send_2( Y,X, msg2 );
recv_3( X,Y, msg3 );
send_4( Y,X, msg4 );
claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
}
}