scyther/gui/Protocols/IKE/ikev2-eap.cpp
Cas Cremers 34d7cba293 Added IKE base models.
Modelers: Adrian Kyburz and Cas Cremers
2012-11-15 11:48:14 +01:00

132 lines
3.2 KiB
C++

/**********************************************************************
* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
* @subprotocol IKE EAP
* @reference RFC 4306
* @variant Includes optional payloads
**********************************************************************/
/**
* MACRO DEFINITIONS
* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
*/
#define __IKEV2__
#ifndef __ORACLE__
#include "common.h"
#endif
#define AUTHii {SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni, Nr, prf(SKi, I)}sk(I)
#define AUTHir {SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni, Nr, prf(SKr, I)}sk(I)
#define AUTHri {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, Gr, Nr, Ni, prf(SKi, R)}sk(R)
#define AUTHrr {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, g(r), Nr, Ni, prf(SKr, R)}sk(R)
usertype Number, SecurityAssociation, TrafficSelector;
const O: Number;
const SA1 ,SA2, SA3: SecurityAssociation;
const TSi, TSr: TrafficSelector;
/**
* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
*/
protocol @executability(E) {
#define Gi g(i)
#define Gr g(r)
role E {
var i, r, Ni, Nr, SPIi, SPIr, EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
var I, R: Agent;
// msg 3
recv_!E1( E, E, {I, R, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
send_!E2( E, E, {I, R, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
// msg 4
recv_!E3( E, E, {R, AUTHrr, EAP}SKr );
send_!E4( E, E, {R, AUTHri, EAP}SKi );
// msg 5
recv_!E5( E, E, {EAP}SKi );
send_!E6( E, E, {EAP}SKr );
// msg 6
recv_!E7( E, E, {EAPOK}SKr );
send_!E8( E, E, {EAPOK}SKi );
// msg 7
recv_!E9( E, E, {AUTHii}SKi );
send_!EA( E, E, {AUTHir}SKr );
// msg 8
send_!EB( E, E, {AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!EC( E, E, {AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
}
#undef Gi
#undef Gr
}
protocol ikev2-eap(I, R)
{
role I {
fresh i, Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
var Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
var EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
var Gr: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
send_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni );
recv_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, Gr, Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
send_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
recv_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHri, EAP}SKi );
send_!5( I, R, HDR, {EAP}SKi );
recv_!6( R, I, HDR, {EAPOK}SKi );
claim( I, Running, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
send_!7( I, R, HDR, {AUTHii}SKi );
recv_!8( R, I, HDR, {AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( I, SKR, SKi );
claim( I, Alive );
claim( I, Weakagree );
claim( I, Commit, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
}
role R {
fresh EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
fresh r, Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
var Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
var Gi: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
recv_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni );
send_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, g(r), Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
recv_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHrr, EAP}SKr );
recv_!5( I, R, HDR, {EAP}SKr );
send_!6( R, I, HDR, {EAPOK}SKr );
recv_!7( I, R, HDR, {AUTHir}SKr );
claim( R, Running, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
send_!8( R, I, HDR, {AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( R, SKR, SKr );
claim( R, Alive );
claim( R, Weakagree );
claim( R, Commit, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
}
}