scyther/spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco.spdl
gijs 0f54f2ed23 - Update modeling of needham schroeder to better reflect the modelling in
SPORE:
    - pk is not known to all agents, only pk(Simon) is known
- Use new naming convention:
    - Protocol name starting with an @ means internal protocol
    - For non internal protocols naming is as follows:
      protocolname-variant^subprotocol
    For example: yahalom-Lowe^KeyCompromise meaning the key compromise sub
    protocol of the Lowe variant of the Yahalom protocol.
2005-08-15 13:31:48 +00:00

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# Denning-Sacco shared key
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/denningSacco.html
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
#
usertype Key;
usertype SessionKey;
usertype TimeStamp;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
protocol denningSacco^KeyCompromise(C)
{
// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
role C {
const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const T: ExpiredTimeStamp;
var I,R,S: Agent;
read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
send_C2(C,C, (I,R),
{R,Kir,T,{Kir,I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
{Kir,I,T}k(R,S),
Kir
);
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
}
}
protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
var W: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: TimeStamp;
send_1(I,S, I,R );
read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
send_3(I,R, W);
claim_I1(I,Niagree);
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
claim_I3(I,Secret,Kir);
claim_I4(I,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
}
role R
{
var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: TimeStamp;
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
claim_R1(R,Niagree);
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
claim_R4(R,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
}
role S
{
var W: Ticket;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const T: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,R );
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
# Note because the modelchecker does not support tickets this might not
# be very useful
run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);