scyther/gui/Protocols/IKE/ikev2-mac.cpp
Cas Cremers 34d7cba293 Added IKE base models.
Modelers: Adrian Kyburz and Cas Cremers
2012-11-15 11:48:14 +01:00

105 lines
2.6 KiB
C++

/**********************************************************************
* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
* @subprotocol MAC authenticated IKEv2
* @reference RFC 4306
* @variant Includes optional payloads
**********************************************************************/
/**
* MACRO DEFINITIONS
* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
*/
#define __IKEV2__
#ifndef __ORACLE__
#include "common.h"
#endif
#define AUTHii MAC(k(I,R), SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni, Nr, prf(SKi, I))
#define AUTHir MAC(k(R,I), SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni, Nr, prf(SKr, I))
#define AUTHri MAC(k(I,R), SPIi, SPIr, SA1, Gr, Nr, Ni, prf(SKi, R))
#define AUTHrr MAC(k(R,I), SPIi, SPIr, SA1, g(r), Nr, Ni, prf(SKr, R))
usertype Number, SecurityAssociation, TrafficSelector;
const O: Number;
const SA1 ,SA2, SA3: SecurityAssociation;
const TSi, TSr: TrafficSelector;
/**
* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
*/
protocol @executability(E) {
#define Gi g(i)
#define Gr g(r)
role E {
var i, r, Ni, Nr, SPIi, SPIr: Nonce;
var I, R: Agent;
// msg 3
recv_!E1( E, E, {I, R, AUTHii, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
send_!E2( E, E, {I, R, AUTHir, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
// msg 4
recv_!E3( E, E, {R, AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!E4( E, E, {R, AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
}
#undef Gi
#undef Gr
}
protocol ikev2-mac(I, R)
{
role I {
fresh i, Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
var Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
var Gr: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
send_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni );
recv_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, Gr, Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
claim( I, Running, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr);
send_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, AUTHii, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
recv_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( I, SKR, SKi );
claim( I, Alive );
claim( I, Weakagree );
claim( I, Commit, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr);
}
role R {
fresh r, Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
var Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
var Gi: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
recv_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni );
send_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, g(r), Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
recv_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, AUTHir, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
claim( R, Running, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr);
send_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( R, SKR, SKr );
claim( R, Alive );
claim( R, Weakagree );
claim( R, Commit, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr);
}
}