- For the TimeStamps etc, we can implement an 'auto-leak' of such local
  constants. This should works also with a modifier of sorts (e.g.
  'predictable') and such constants should be leaked to the intruder at
  the start of the run, possibly by prefixing a send.
- best heuristic currently for -t8: ignore sendsfirst, just look at the
  previous event and continue at that run.
- termPrint must currently be encapsulated in a math environment to work in
  latex output, I wil change this later to some ensure mathmode construct,
  probably with something like latexTermPrint.
- The trace incremental search should start at something like 'distance of
  first claim + SOMECONST * runs'. SOMECONST relates to the partial-order
  induced trace prolonings.
- For now, CLP is non-working and not checked. Reconsider this later.
- Because the properties checked are related to the partial order reductions,
  it makes sense to check 'all secrecy claims' or 'all synchronisation claims'
  at once.
- Once an attack is generated, we know the actual scenario and the trace
  length. We might re-use this information to generate the shortest attack
  using no partial order reduction.  Note that choosing a wise method of
  finding that is a mathematical issue: searching -t1 is exponential, so how
  do we step trough these traces in order to find the shortest trace in the
  quickest way? This can be determined under some (statistical) assumptions.
- The incremental check can be done much easier, by just retrying the main
  loop explore with different parameters. It keeps everything nicely intact.
  We must check for fails however, and how pruning is affected.
- Incremental check can at least be done in two ways: either by limiting the
  number of runs (big axe method) or by limiting the trace length (nice).
  There is a drawback to trace length only: the superfluous sends of the
  algorithm in a scenario with many runs might interfere with the usefulness
  of short traces. Maybe some heuristic that reduces the runs automatically is
  required. (e.g. 'number of runs is at most MaxTraceLength/MaxRoleLength' or
  something like that). Do analysis.
- If synch checking is expensive, introduce a limit (for -p0 stuff).
  Basically, after the limit (if -p0 is set), we stop checking synch claims.
  This then is default behaviour, to be overridden or changed by a switch.
- clp does not yet consider the matching for variables that have not been
  instantiated. This *might* lead to some improvement, e.g. when there is only
  one candidate for the variable. In general, I don't think it will help.
- match_clp.c 1.25 introduced the variable_in_invkey brancher, which hasn't
  been thoroughly tested yet. Please do test.
- Brutus is slower than -t4. CLP is much, much faster however than both.
- It is very important to have variables in the run agent list, because it
  dramatically decreases the complexity of the system, as opposed to just
  creating runs for all possibilities. However, this explicitly introduces the
  clp problem of var encryptions (see above).
- Given originator assumptions and such, we might want to implement the
  compiler, that for non-typed matching, it will ignore all type definitions
  in the code (as in, putting them in stype, but still considering Function).
  Then, for 'any agent' we can use stype silently. The modelchecker should
  then always consider the types with -m0 and -m1.
- In a paper concerning the CASRUL compiler, they mention associativity for
  the equality relations.  Note that CASRUL restricts the intruder actions,
  and sometimes uses approximations.
- MS and CE never mention associativity as a restriction.
- For now, clp stuff will use pairing and simple mgu. Maybe a -m3 switch will
  add the associative variant later.
- MALLOC_TRACE is the environment variable that triggers mtrace() output.
- Several memory leak detectors are still in place, they can all be located by
  searching for "lead" or "diff" and destroying the code.
- knowledgeAddTerm might be improved by scanning through key list only with
  things that are newly added.
- Associativity and unification don't play together well; consider other
  algorithms. Maybe a simple explore (x,y),z and explore x,(y,z) will do, e.g.
  take any split point for both sequences.
- POR (-t3) is actually worse than -t2: sends first. After some pondering I
  now know why. It's because simultaneous reads yield traces in which there
  are attacks that are also in the ones where we have R0S0S0;R1 (i.e. is thus
  equivalent with R0;R1;S0S0)
- Knowledge is monotonous. So, if we say 'R#0' cannot be triggered by some
  knowledge, we can just use a pointer for it. If we do want to trigger it, we
  need to compare two knowledge pointers. As they don't have a unique
  representation, it is more difficult. For now, I will just forbid specific
  branches of the read when a message is in some previous knowledge, which is
  more precise.
- Comparisons with Casper are in order.
- It is a good idea to have any number of input files, and parse them all, to
  combine scenarios. A command should be "require <file>", because that would
  enable scenarios to load the required role definitions. It's require instead
  of include, because of possible multiple occurrences.