const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);

protocol spliceAS(C,AS,S)
{
        role C
	{
		const N1,N2: Nonce;
		const T,L: Nonce;

		send_1(C,AS,  C, S, N1 );
		read_2(AS,C,  AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
		send_3(C,S,   C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
		read_6(S,C,   S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) );

		claim_7(C, Secret, N2);
	}

	role AS
	{
		var N1,N3: Nonce;

		read_1(C,AS,  C, S, N1 );
		send_2(AS,C,  AS, {AS, C, N1, pk(S)}sk(AS) );
		read_4(S,AS,  S, C, N3 );
		send_5(AS,S,  AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
	}

	role S
	{
		const N3: Nonce;
		var N2: Nonce;
		var T,L: Nonce;

		var ni: Nonce;
		const nr: Nonce;

		read_3(C,S,   C, S, {C, T, L, {N2}pk(S)}sk(C) );
		send_4(S,AS,  S, C, N3 );
		read_5(AS,S,  AS, {AS, S, N3, pk(C)}sk(AS) );
		send_6(S,C,   S, C, {S, N2}pk(C) );

		claim_8(S, Secret, N2);
	}
}

const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

run spliceAS.C(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.AS(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);