/*
 * KSL from SPORE
 *
 * Messages 6-8 are intended for repeated authentication, and there are
 * known attacks on this. However, we don't model that yet.
 *
 * Furthermore, it is interesting to experiment here with key
 * compromise (of kab), when this is implemented in Scyther.
 */

usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, Ticket, TicketKey;
secret k: Function;

const s: Server;

/* give the intruder something to work with */

const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);

protocol ksl(A,B,S)
{
	role A
	{
		fresh Na, Ma: Nonce;
		var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
		var T: Ticket;
		var Kab: SessionKey;
		
		send_1(A,B, Na, A);
		read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
		send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
		
		send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
		read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
		send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );

		claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
		claim_A2(A,Niagree);
		claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
	}

	role B
	{
		var Na,Ma: Nonce;
		fresh Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
		var Kab: SessionKey;
		fresh Kbb: TicketKey;
		fresh Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
		var T: Ticket;
		
		read_1(A,B, Na, A);
		send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
		read_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), T );
		send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab );
		read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
		
		read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
		send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
		read_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );

		claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
		claim_B2(B,Niagree);
		claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
	}

	role S
	{
		var Na, Nb: Nonce;
		fresh Kab: SessionKey;

		read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
		send_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
	}
}