/* * Scyther description of Kerberos as in RDDM'07 * */ usertype Sessionkey; usertype Text; secret ktk: Function; secret kck: Function; secret kst: Function; protocol @swapkey-ktk(I,R) { # Protocol added to work around the symmetry problems where k(I,R) != k(R,I) role I { var T:Ticket; read_!X1(R,I,{T}ktk(I,R)); send_!X2(I,R,{T}ktk(R,I)); } role R { } } protocol @swapkey-kck(I,R) { # Protocol added to work around the symmetry problems where k(I,R) != k(R,I) role I { var T:Ticket; read_!X1(R,I,{T}kck(I,R)); send_!X2(I,R,{T}kck(R,I)); } role R { } } protocol @swapkey-kst(I,R) { # Protocol added to work around the symmetry problems where k(I,R) != k(R,I) role I { var T:Ticket; read_!X1(R,I,{T}kst(I,R)); send_!X2(I,R,{T}kst(R,I)); } role R { } } protocol kerberos(C,K,T,S) { role C { fresh n1: Nonce; fresh n2: Nonce; var tgt: Ticket; var st: Ticket; var AKey: Sessionkey; var SKey: Sessionkey; fresh t: Text; send_1(C,K, C,T,n1); read_2(K,C, tgt, { AKey,n1,T }kck(C,K) ); // Stage boundary send_3(C,T, tgt, { C }AKey,C,S,n2 ); read_4(T,C, C, st, { SKey, n2, S }AKey ); // Stage boundary send_5(C,S, st, { C,t }SKey ); read_6(S,C, { t }SKey ); // Theorem 5 (a) // If C,K are honest claim(C,Reachable); // Theorem 6 (a) // If C,K,T are all honest claim(C,Secret,AKey); // Theorem 7 (a) // If C,K,S are all honest claim(C, Reachable); // Theorem 8 // If C,K,S are all honest claim(C, Secret, SKey); } role K { var n1: Nonce; fresh AKey: Sessionkey; read_1(C,K, C,T,n1); send_2(K,C, { AKey, C }ktk(T,K), { AKey,n1,T }kck(C,K) ); // Theorem 6 (a) // If C,K,T are all honest claim_K1(K,Secret,AKey); } role T { var AKey: Sessionkey; var n2: Nonce; fresh SKey: Sessionkey; read_3(C,T, { AKey, C }ktk(T,K), { C }AKey,C,S,n2 ); send_4(T,C, C,{ SKey, C }kst(S,T), { SKey, n2, S }AKey ); // Theorem 5 (a) // If C,K are honest claim(T,Reachable); // Theorem 6 (a) // If C,K,T are all honest claim(T,Secret,AKey); // My own claim(T,Secret,SKey); } role S { var t: Text; var SKey: Sessionkey; read_5(C,S, { SKey, C }kst(S,T), { C,t }SKey ); send_6(S,C, { t }SKey ); // Theorem 7 (b) // If C,K,S,T are honest claim(S, Reachable); // My own claim(S, Secret, t); claim(S, Secret, SKey); } } const Alice,Bob,Charlie,Eve: Agent; // C untrusted // K untrusted // T untrusted // S untrusted