# Amended Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/nssk_amended.html
#
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
#
# Note:
# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.



secret k: Function;
# Model dec that is invertible by inc
const dec,inc: Function;
inversekeys(dec,inc);
usertype SessionKey;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;

protocol needhamschroederskamendSessionKeyCompromise(C)
{
    // Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
    // corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
    role C {
        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        var I,R,S: Agent;

        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
        send_C2(C,C,    I,
                        {I,Nr}k(R,S),
                        I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S),
                        {Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                        {Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S),
                        {Nr}Kir,
                        {{Nr}dec}Kir,
                        Kir
               );
        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
    }
}

protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
{
    role I
    {
        const Ni: Nonce;
        var Nr: Nonce;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        var T,T2: Ticket;
        
        send_1(I,R,I);
        read_2(R,I,T);
        send_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,T));
        read_4(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T2}k(I,S));
        send_5(I,R,T2);
        read_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
        send_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
        
        claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
        claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
        claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }    
    
    role R
    {
        const Nr: Nonce;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        
        read_1(I,R,I);
        send_2(R,I,{I,Nr}k(R,S));
        read_5(I,R,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S));
        send_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
        read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
        claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
        claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
        claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role S
    {
        var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        read_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
        send_4(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
    }
    
}

const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
 
run needhamschroederskamend.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run needhamschroederskamend.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run needhamschroederskamend.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run needhamschroederskamend.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run needhamschroederskamend.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run needhamschroederskamend.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);