# Buttyan Nagy Vajda protocol 1 (3-party)
#
# Modelled after the description in the paper
# "Efficient multi-party challenge-response protocols for entity
# authentication"
#
# Attacks:
# Does not satisfy ni-agree, because when Alice in the A role terminates
# it cannot be sure that the agent in role B is aware of having sent a
# reply for Alice.
# A type flaw attack exists in which there are only two agents active.
#

secret k: Function;

protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
{
    role Swap
    {
        var T: Ticket;
	var A,B: Agent;

	read_1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(A,B) );
	send_2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(B,A) );
    }
}

protocol bunava13(A,B,C)
{
    role A
    {
        const ra: Nonce;
	var rb,rc: Nonce;

	send_1(A,B, ra);
	read_3(C,A, rc,{C,rb,B,ra}k(A,C) );
	send_4(A,B, {A,rc,C,rb}k(A,B) );

	claim_A1(A, Niagree);
	claim_A2(A, Nisynch);
    }

    role B
    {
        const rb: Nonce;
	var ra,rc: Nonce;

	read_1(A,B, ra);
	send_2(B,C, rb,{B,ra}k(B,C) );
	read_4(A,B, {A,rc,C,rb}k(A,B) );
	send_5(B,C, {B,A,rc}k(B,C) );

	claim_B1(B, Niagree);
	claim_B2(B, Nisynch);
    }

    role C
    {
        const rc: Nonce;
	var ra,rb: Nonce;

	read_2(B,C, rb,{B,ra}k(B,C) );
	send_3(C,A, rc,{C,rb,B,ra}k(A,C) );
	read_5(B,C, {B,A,rc}k(B,C) );

	claim_C1(C, Niagree);
	claim_C2(C, Nisynch);
    }
}

const Alice,Bob,Charlie,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Charlie,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Charlie);

# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
 
run bunava13.A(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run bunava13.B(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run bunava13.C(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run bunava13.A(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run bunava13.B(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run bunava13.C(Agent,Agent,Agent);