# Kao Chow Authentication v.1
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kaoChow1.html
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) 
#

usertype Sessionkey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function;

protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
{
    role I
    {
        const ni: Nonce;
        var nr: Nonce;
        var kir: Sessionkey;

        send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
        read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
        send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );

        claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
        claim_I2 (I, Niagree);
        claim_I3 (I, Secret, kir);
        claim_I4 (I, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
    }    
    
    role R
    {
        var ni: Nonce;
        const nr: Nonce;
        var kir: Sessionkey;
        var T;

        read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) ); 
        send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
        read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );

        claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
        claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
        claim_R3 (R, Secret, kir);
        claim_R4 (R, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
    }

    role S
    {
        var ni: Nonce;
        const kir: Sessionkey;

        read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
        send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S)  ); 
    }
}

const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);