# Neumann Stubblebine
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/neumannStubblebine.html
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
#
# Note:
# In SPORE this protocol is not described correctly, there are in fact 2
# different protocols (the key establishment protocol and the repeated
# authentication protocol)

usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;

const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;

const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
{
    const Kir: SessionKey;

    role I
    {
        const Mi: Nonce;
        var Mr: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        const Tr: TimeStamp;

        send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
        read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
        send_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
        claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
        claim_I2(I,Niagree);
        claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
        claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role R
    {
        const Mr: Nonce;
        var Tr: TimeStamp;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        var Mi: Nonce;
        
        read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
        send_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
        read_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
        claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
        claim_R2(R,Niagree);
        claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
        claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role S 
    {
    }
}
protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{
    role I
    {
        const Ni: Nonce;
        var Nr: Nonce;
        var T: Ticket;
        var Tb: TimeStamp;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        
        send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
        read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
        send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
        
        claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
        claim_I2(I,Niagree);
        claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
        claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role R
    {
        var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
        const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        const Tb: TimeStamp;
        var T: Ticket;
        
        read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
        send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
        read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
    
        claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
        claim_R2(R,Niagree);
        claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
        claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role S
    {
        var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        var Tb: TimeStamp;

        read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
        send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
    }
}