const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const P1;
const P2;

protocol nsl3th3ni(I,R)
{
	role I
	{
		const ni,ni: Nonce;
		var nr,nr2: Nonce;

		send_1(I,R, {P1,I,ni}pk(R) );
		read_1b(R,I, {nr}pk(I) );
		read_2(R,I, {P1,ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
		send_3(I,R, {P1,nr}pk(R) );

		//claim_i(I,Nisynch);

		send_21(I,R, {P2,I,ni}pk(R) );
		read_21b(R,I, {nr2}pk(I) );
		read_22(R,I, {P2,ni,nr2,R}pk(I) );
		send_23(I,R, {P2,nr2}pk(R) );

		claim_i2(I,Nisynch);
	}	
	
	role R
	{
		var ni,ni: Nonce;
		const nr,nr2: Nonce;

		read_1(I,R, {P1,I,ni}pk(R) );
		send_1b(R,I, {nr}pk(I) );
		send_2(R,I, {P1,ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
		read_3(I,R, {P1,nr}pk(R) );

		//claim_r(R,Nisynch);

		read_21(I,R, {P2,I,ni}pk(R) );
		send_21b(R,I, {nr2}pk(I) );
		send_22(R,I, {P2,ni,nr2,R}pk(I) );
		read_23(I,R, {P2,nr2}pk(R) );

		claim_r2(R,Nisynch);
	}
}


const Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);