usertype Sessionkey;
usertype Ticket;
secret k: Function;

protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
{
	role I
	{
		const ni: Nonce;
		var nr: Nonce;
		var kir: Sessionkey;

		send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
		read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
		send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );

		claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
		claim_6 (I, Niagree);
		claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
	}	
	
	role R
	{
		var ni: Nonce;
		const nr: Nonce;
		var kir: Sessionkey;
		var T;

		read_2 (S,R, { T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) }k(R,S) ); 
		send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
		read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );

		claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
		claim_9 (R, Niagree);
		claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
	}

	role S
	{
		var ni: Nonce;
		const kir: Sessionkey;

		read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
		send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S)  ); 
	}
}

const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);