// Yahalom protocol

const a,b,s,Eve : Agent;
secret k : Function;

untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,s);

protocol yahalomlowe(A,B,S)
{
	role A
	{
		const na: Nonce;
		var nb: Nonce;
		var kab: Sessionkey;

		send_1(A,B, A,na);
		read_3(S,A, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S) );
		send_5(A,B, {A,B,S,nb}kab );
		claim(A, kab);
	}

	role B
	{
		const nb: Nonce;
		var na: Nonce;
		var kab: Sessionkey;

		read_1(A,B, A,na);
		send_2(B,S, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
		read_4(S,B, {A,kab}k(B,S) );
		read_5(A,B, {A,B,S,nb}kab );
		claim(B, kab);
	}

	role S
	{
		const kab: Sessionkey;
		var na,nb: Nonce;

		read_2(B,S, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
		send_3(S,A, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S) );
		send_4(S,B, {A,kab}k(B,S) );
	}
}

run yahalomlowe.A(Agent,Agent,s);
run yahalomlowe.B(Agent,Agent,s);
run yahalomlowe.S(Agent,Agent,s);

run yahalomlowe.A(Agent,Agent,s);
run yahalomlowe.B(Agent,Agent,s);