More 'read'->'recv' conversion.
This commit is contained in:
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3a6d65463f
commit
d713ac400d
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ protocol bke(I,R)
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
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read_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
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recv_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
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send_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
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claim_4 (I, Secret, kir );
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//claim_5 (I, Niagree );
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@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ protocol bke(I,R)
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fresh nr: Nonce;
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fresh kir: SessionKey;
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read_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
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recv_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
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send_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
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read_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
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recv_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
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claim_7 (R, Secret, kir );
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//claim_8 (R, Niagree );
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//claim_9 (R, Nisynch );
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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# a given term crypted with k(I,R) with k(R,I)
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#
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# Note:
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# Read 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
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# Recv 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
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# as it allows trivial synchronisation attacks otherwise (the message is
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# completely fresh and can therefore always be replaced by an arbitrary value
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# created by the intruder) which are not considered in SPORE
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protocol @swapkey(X)
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{
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var I,R: Agent;
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var T:Ticket;
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read_!X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
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recv_!X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
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send_!X2(X,X,{T}k(R,I));
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}
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}
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@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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recv_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
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read_6(R,I, nr);
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recv_6(R,I, nr);
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}
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role R
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@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
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fresh nr: Nonce;
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fresh kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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recv_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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recv_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_6(R,I, nr);
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claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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recv_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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recv_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I3(I,Secret, kir);
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@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
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fresh nr,nr2: Nonce;
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fresh kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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recv_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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recv_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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# So it is possile that certain attacks that use this property are not found
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#
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# Note:
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# Read 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
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# Recv 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
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# as it allows trivial synchronisation attacks otherwise (the message is
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# completely fresh and can therefore always be replaced by an arbitrary value
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# created by the intruder) which are not considered in SPORE
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@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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recv_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I2(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_I3(I,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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read_4(R,I, nr );
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recv_4(R,I, nr );
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}
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role R
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@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
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fresh nr: Nonce;
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fresh kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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recv_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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recv_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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send_4(R,I, nr );
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claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R2(R,Secret, kir);
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ protocol boyd(I,R,S)
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var ks: Macseed;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R, ni );
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read_3 (R,I, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), m(ni, m(ks,ni,nr)), nr );
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recv_3 (R,I, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), m(ni, m(ks,ni,nr)), nr );
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send_4 (I,R, m(nr, m(ks,ni,nr)) );
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claim_6 (I, Secret, m(ks,ni,nr) );
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@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol boyd(I,R,S)
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fresh nr: Nonce;
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var ks: Macseed;
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read_2 (S,R, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), { I,R, ks }k(R,S), ni );
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recv_2 (S,R, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), { I,R, ks }k(R,S), ni );
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send_3 (R,I, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), m(ni, m(ks,ni,nr)), nr );
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read_4 (I,R, m(nr, m(ks,ni,nr)) );
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recv_4 (I,R, m(nr, m(ks,ni,nr)) );
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claim_10 (R, Secret, m(ks,ni,nr));
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}
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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol boyd(I,R,S)
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var ni,nr: Nonce;
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fresh ks: Macseed;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R, ni );
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recv_1 (I,S, I,R, ni );
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send_2 (S,R, { I,R, ks }k(I,S), { I,R, ks }k(R,S), ni );
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}
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}
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
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var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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read_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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recv_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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send_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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}
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@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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fresh Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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recv_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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read_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
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recv_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
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claim_5(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
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var Nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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recv_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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recv_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
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var T: TimeStamp;
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fresh Nr: Nonce;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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recv_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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recv_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
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fresh Kir: SessionKey;
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fresh T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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recv_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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claim_x(S, Secret, Kir);
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}
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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var T: TimeStamp;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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recv_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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recv_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
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@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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fresh Kir: SessionKey;
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fresh T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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recv_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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}
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol gongnonceb(I,R,S)
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var kr: Keypart;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R, { I,S,I, ki, R }k(I,S), ni );
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read_4 (S,I, { S,I,R,kr,I }k(I,S), { R,I,ni }f(ki,kr), nr );
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recv_4 (S,I, { S,I,R,kr,I }k(I,S), { R,I,ni }f(ki,kr), nr );
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send_5 (I,R, { I,R,nr }f(ki,kr) );
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claim_6 (I, Secret, ki);
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@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ protocol gongnonceb(I,R,S)
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fresh kr: Keypart;
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var ki: Keypart;
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read_2 (S,R, I,R, { S,R,I, ki, R }k(R,S), ni );
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recv_2 (S,R, I,R, { S,R,I, ki, R }k(R,S), ni );
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send_3 (R,S, { R,S,R,kr,I }k(R,S), { R,I, ni }f(ki,kr), nr );
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read_5 (I,R, { I,R,nr }f(ki,kr) );
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recv_5 (I,R, { I,R,nr }f(ki,kr) );
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claim_10 (R, Secret, ki);
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claim_11 (R, Secret, kr);
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@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ protocol gongnonceb(I,R,S)
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var ki,kr: Keypart;
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var T;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R, { I,S,I, ki, R }k(I,S), ni );
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recv_1 (I,S, I,R, { I,S,I, ki, R }k(I,S), ni );
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send_2 (S,R, I,R, { S,R,I, ki, R }k(R,S), ni );
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read_3 (R,S, { R,S,R,kr,I }k(R,S), T, nr );
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recv_3 (R,S, { R,S,R,kr,I }k(R,S), T, nr );
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send_4 (S,I, { S,I,R,kr,I }k(I,S), T, nr );
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}
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}
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol gongnonce(I,R,S)
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var kr: Keypart;
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send_1 (I,R, I,R,ni );
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read_3 (S,I, { S,I,R, kr, I, ni }k(I,S), nr);
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recv_3 (S,I, { S,I,R, kr, I, ni }k(I,S), nr);
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send_4 (I,S, { I,S,I, ki, R, nr }k(I,S) );
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claim_6 (I, Secret, ki);
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@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol gongnonce(I,R,S)
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fresh kr: Keypart;
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var ki: Keypart;
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read_1 (I,R, I,R,ni );
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recv_1 (I,R, I,R,ni );
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send_2 (R,S, I,R, nr, { R,S,R, kr, I,ni }k(R,S));
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read_5 (S,R, { S,R,I, ki, R, nr }k(R,S) );
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recv_5 (S,R, { S,R,I, ki, R, nr }k(R,S) );
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claim_10 (R, Secret, ki);
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claim_11 (R, Secret, kr);
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@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ protocol gongnonce(I,R,S)
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var ni,nr: Nonce;
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var ki,kr: Keypart;
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read_2 (R,S, I,R, nr, { R,S,R, kr, I,ni }k(R,S));
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recv_2 (R,S, I,R, nr, { R,S,R, kr, I,ni }k(R,S));
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send_3 (S,I, { S,I,R, kr, I, ni }k(I,S), nr);
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read_4 (I,S, { I,S,I, ki, R, nr }k(I,S) );
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recv_4 (I,S, { I,S,I, ki, R, nr }k(I,S) );
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send_5 (S,R, { S,R,I, ki, R, nr }k(R,S) );
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}
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}
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ protocol isoiec11770213(I,R,S)
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var kir: Sessionkey;
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send_1 (I,R, ni);
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read_4 (R,I, { ni,kir,R }k(I,S) );
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recv_4 (R,I, { ni,kir,R }k(I,S) );
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claim_5 (I, Secret, kir);
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}
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@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ protocol isoiec11770213(I,R,S)
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fresh kir: Sessionkey;
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var T;
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read_1 (I,R, ni);
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recv_1 (I,R, ni);
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send_2 (R,S, { nr,ni,I,kir }k(R,S) );
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read_3 (S,R, { nr, I }k(R,S), T );
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recv_3 (S,R, { nr, I }k(R,S), T );
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send_4 (R,I, T );
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claim_6 (R, Secret, kir);
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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ protocol isoiec11770213(I,R,S)
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var ni,nr: Nonce;
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var kir: Sessionkey;
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read_2 (R,S, { nr,ni,I,kir }k(R,S) );
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recv_2 (R,S, { nr,ni,I,kir }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (S,R, { nr, I }k(R,S), { ni,kir,R }k(I,S) );
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}
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}
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
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var kir,kt: SessionKey;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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recv_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
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@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
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var kir,kt: SessionKey;
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var T: Ticket;
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read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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recv_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
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var ni: Nonce;
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fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
recv_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
fresh tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
recv_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
recv_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
read_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
|
||||
read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
recv_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
send_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -46,15 +46,15 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, T, { Tr, I, Kir }Kbb, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
read_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
read_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
recv_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
read_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I,T);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I,T);
|
||||
send_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,T));
|
||||
read_4(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T2}k(I,S));
|
||||
recv_4(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T2}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_5(I,R,T2);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I,{I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
read_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
|
||||
recv_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
|
||||
send_4(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,T);
|
||||
read_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
read_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
recv_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
send_2(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_i1(I,Secret,ni);
|
||||
@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_r1(R,Secret,ni);
|
||||
claim_r2(R,Secret,nr);
|
||||
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_i1(I,Secret,ni);
|
||||
@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_r1(R,Secret,ni);
|
||||
claim_r2(R,Secret,nr);
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
fresh Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ protocol soph(I,R)
|
||||
fresh ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, ni );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, ni );
|
||||
claim_3(I,Niagree);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ protocol soph(I,R)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, ni );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
recv_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
fresh Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ki,Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
recv_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ protocol wmfbrutus(A,B,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var kab : SesKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,B, { A, kab }k(B,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,B, { A, kab }k(B,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_3(B, Secret,kab);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ protocol wmfbrutus(A,B,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var kab : SesKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(A,S, A, { B,kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
recv_1(A,S, A, { B,kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,B, { A, kab }k(B,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
|
||||
# Note:
|
||||
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol, scyther
|
||||
# finds one however this has to do with the unusual assumption that every
|
||||
# agent can recognise and will reject to read messages that it has created
|
||||
# agent can recognise and will reject to recv messages that it has created
|
||||
# itself.
|
||||
|
||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I,R, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,R,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T1);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T1);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, T1, {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, T2, {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, T2, {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I, T2, {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson-modified(A,B,S)
|
||||
var kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
read_3(S,A, nb, {B,kab,na}k(A,S), ticket );
|
||||
recv_3(S,A, nb, {B,kab,na}k(A,S), ticket );
|
||||
send_4(A,B, ticket, {nb}kab );
|
||||
claim_5(A, Secret,kab);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson-modified(A,B,S)
|
||||
var ticket: Ticket;
|
||||
var kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
recv_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, B, nb, {A,na}k(B,S) );
|
||||
read_4(A,B, {A,B,kab,nb}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
|
||||
recv_4(A,B, {A,B,kab,nb}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
|
||||
claim_6(B, Secret,kab);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson-modified(A,B,S)
|
||||
fresh kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
var na,nb: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(B,S, B, nb, {A,na}k(B,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(B,S, B, nb, {A,na}k(B,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,A, nb, {B,kab,na}k(A,S), {A,B,kab,nb}k(B,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson(A,B,S)
|
||||
var kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
read_3(S,A, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S), ticket );
|
||||
recv_3(S,A, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S), ticket );
|
||||
send_4(A,B, ticket, {nb}kab );
|
||||
claim_5(A, Secret,kab);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson(A,B,S)
|
||||
var ticket: Ticket;
|
||||
var kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
recv_1(A,B, A,na);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, B, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
|
||||
read_4(A,B, {A,kab}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
|
||||
recv_4(A,B, {A,kab}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
|
||||
claim_6(B, Secret,kab);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson(A,B,S)
|
||||
fresh kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
var na,nb: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(B,S, B, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(B,S, B, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,A, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S), {A,kab}k(B,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim(S, Secret, Ni);
|
||||
|
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
|
||||
# a given term crypted with k(I,R) with k(R,I)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note:
|
||||
# Read 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
|
||||
# Recv 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
|
||||
# as it allows trivial synchronisation attacks otherwise (the message is
|
||||
# completely fresh and can therefore always be replaced by an arbitrary value
|
||||
# created by the intruder) which are not considered in SPORE
|
||||
@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
|
||||
|
||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||
const Compromised: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol @swapkey(X)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ protocol @swapkey(X)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var I,R: Agent;
|
||||
var T:Ticket;
|
||||
read_!X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
|
||||
recv_!X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
|
||||
send_!X2(X,X,{T}k(R,I));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -42,12 +41,12 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, nr);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, nr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
@ -56,9 +55,9 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
|
||||
send_6(R,I, nr);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
|
@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Secret, kir);
|
||||
@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
|
||||
fresh nr,nr2: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
|
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
|
||||
# So it is possile that certain attacks that use this property are not found
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note:
|
||||
# Read 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
|
||||
# Recv 4 by the Initatior has been placed after the synchronisation claim
|
||||
# as it allows trivial synchronisation attacks otherwise (the message is
|
||||
# completely fresh and can therefore always be replaced by an arbitrary value
|
||||
# created by the intruder) which are not considered in SPORE
|
||||
@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret, kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
|
||||
read_4(R,I, nr );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,ni );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, nr );
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret, kir);
|
||||
|
@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
|
||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||
const succ: Function;
|
||||
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||
const Compromised: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol andrew(I,R)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -23,9 +22,9 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -38,9 +37,9 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
|
||||
fresh nr,nr2: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-1(I,R)
|
||||
fresh Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
|
||||
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding recv events
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-1(I,R)
|
||||
var Ta: Timestamp;
|
||||
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R)
|
||||
const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
|
||||
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding receive events
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R)
|
||||
var Ta: Timestamp;
|
||||
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-3(I,R)
|
||||
fresh Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Ya);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol ccitt509-3(I,R)
|
||||
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret,Ya);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Secret,Yb);
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
|
||||
var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
read_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
|
||||
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
|
||||
const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
|
||||
send_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
|
||||
claim_5(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, W);
|
||||
read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,SKR,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
fresh T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, W);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
fresh T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir,kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
recv_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir,kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
recv_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
recv_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
fresh tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
recv_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
recv_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
recv_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
read_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {R,Ni}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {R,Ni}Kir );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
|
||||
read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi, R}Kir );
|
||||
recv_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi, R}Kir );
|
||||
send_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, T, { Tr, I, Kir }Kbb, Nc, {R, Ni}Kir );
|
||||
read_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
read_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
recv_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi,R}Kir );
|
||||
read_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
read_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
|
||||
read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
recv_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
send_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, Ni, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, T, { Tr, I, Kir }Kbb, Nc, {Ni}Kir );
|
||||
read_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
read_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
recv_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
|
||||
read_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, (I,R));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {Ni,Nr,R}pk(I));
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, {Ni,Nr,R}pk(I));
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
send_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
read_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Ni,Nr,R}pk(I));
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
read_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
recv_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
send_2(S,I,{pk(R),R}sk(S));
|
||||
read_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
send_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -27,11 +27,11 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I,T);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I,T);
|
||||
send_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,T));
|
||||
read_4(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T2}k(I,S));
|
||||
recv_4(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T2}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_5(I,R,T2);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R,I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I,{I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||
@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
read_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
|
||||
recv_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
|
||||
send_4(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,T);
|
||||
read_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
read_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
recv_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
send_2(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {Ni, Nr}pk(I));
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, {Ni, Nr}pk(I));
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
recv_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
send_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
read_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Ni,Nr}pk(I));
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
read_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
recv_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
send_2(S,I,{pk(R),R}sk(S));
|
||||
read_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S,(R,I));
|
||||
send_5(S,R,{pk(I),I}sk(S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
recv_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_!4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb ,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_!4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_!4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
recv_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
recv_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
recv_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -82,9 +82,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
recv_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
@ -76,9 +76,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
recv_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
fresh Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
|
||||
var VoRi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, {VoKey,{CW}VoR}k(I,R));
|
||||
read_2(R,I, VoRi);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, VoRi);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, VoR, {{VoRi}hash}VoKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
|
||||
var VoKey: SessionKey;
|
||||
fresh VoRi: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, {VoKey,T}k(I,R));
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, {VoKey,T}k(I,R));
|
||||
send_2(R,I, VoRi);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, VoR,{{VoRi}hash}VoKey);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, VoR,{{VoRi}hash}VoKey);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -48,9 +48,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
fresh nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
recv_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
fresh Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ki,Kr: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
recv_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
|
||||
# Note:
|
||||
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol, scyther
|
||||
# finds one however this has to do with the unusual assumption that every
|
||||
# agent can recognise and will reject to read messages that it has created
|
||||
# agent can recognise and will reject to messages that it has created
|
||||
# itself.
|
||||
|
||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {S, Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I,R, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,R,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -25,11 +25,11 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, {I, T}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I,{Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I,{Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
recv_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
recv_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
send_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, T1);
|
||||
recv_3(I,R, T1);
|
||||
send_4(R,S, T1, {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(S,R, T2, {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(S,R, T2, {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_6(R,I, T2, {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
recv_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
recv_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
recv_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
recv_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
recv_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
recv_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
fresh Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
recv_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim(S, Secret, Ni);
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user