- Scanned protocols for new obligatory check.

spdl/SPORE/andrew-ban-concrete.spdl

@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ protocol @swapkey(X)
     {
         var I,R: Agent;
         var T:Ticket;
-        read_X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
+        read_!X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
-        send_X2(X,X,{T}k(R,I));
+        send_!X2(X,X,{T}k(R,I));
     }
 }
 
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete^KeyCompromise(C)
         const kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,ni),
                         {ni,kir}k(I,R),
                         {ni}kir,
                         nr,

spdl/SPORE/andrew-ban.spdl

@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ protocol andrew-Ban^KeyCompromise(C)
         const kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
                         {ni,nr}k(I,R),
                         {nr}k(I,R),
                         {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R),

spdl/SPORE/andrew-lowe-ban.spdl

@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan^KeyCompromise(C)
         const kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,ni),
                         {ni,kir,R}k(I,R),
                         {ni}kir,
                         nr,

spdl/SPORE/andrew.spdl

@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ protocol andrew^KeyCompromise(C)
         const kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,{ni}k(I,R)),
                         {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R),
                         {succ(nr)}k(I,R),
                         {kir,nr2}k(I,R),

spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
         const T: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R),
                         {R,Kir,T,{Kir,I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                         {Kir,I,T}k(R,S),
                         {Nr}Kir,

spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco.spdl

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ protocol denningSacco^KeyCompromise(C)
         const T: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R),
                         {R,Kir,T,{Kir,I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                         {Kir,I,T}k(R,S),
                         Kir

spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v2.spdl

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ protocol kaochow-2^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir,Kt: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(I,S),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
                         R, Nr,

spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v3.spdl

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ protocol kaochow-3^KeyCompromise(C)
         const T2: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(I,S),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
                         {Ni,Kir}Kt,

spdl/SPORE/kaochow.spdl

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ protocol kaochow^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir}k(I,S),
                         {I,R,Ni,Kir}k(R,S),
                         {Ni}Kir, Nr,

spdl/SPORE/key-compromise/needham-schroeder-sk.spdl

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ protocol needhamschroederSessionKeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                         {Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                         {Kir,I}k(R,S),
                         {Nr}Kir,

spdl/SPORE/ksl-lowe.spdl

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (Ni,I),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (Ni,I),
                         (Ni,I,Nr,R),
                         {I,Nr,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
                         {Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{R,Ni}k(I,R),

spdl/SPORE/needham-schroeder-sk-amend.spdl

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,
                         {I,Nr}k(R,S),
                         I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S),
                         {Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S),

spdl/SPORE/needham-schroeder-sk.spdl

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                         {Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                         {Kir,I}k(R,S),
                         {Nr}Kir,

spdl/SPORE/neumannstub-hwang.spdl

@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
                         R,{I,Ni,Tr,Nr}k(R,S),
                         {R,Ni,Kir,Tr}k(I,S),
                         {I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S), Nr,

spdl/SPORE/neumannstub-keycompromise.spdl

@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ protocol neustub^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
                         R,{I,Ni,Tr}k(R,S),Nr,
                         {R,Ni,Kir,Tr}k(I,S),
                         {I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S), Nr,

spdl/SPORE/otwayrees.spdl

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ protocol otwayRees^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S),
                         {Nr,M,I,R}k(R,S),
                         {Ni,Kir}k(I,S), {Nr,Kir}k(R,S),
                         Kir

spdl/SPORE/tmn.spdl

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ protocol tmn^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kr,Ki: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    R,{Ki}pk(S),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    R,{Ki}pk(S),
                         I, {Kr}pk(S),
                         {Kr}Ki,
                         Kr

spdl/SPORE/wmf-lowe.spdl

@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Ti,Ts: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I, {I,Ti,R,Kir}k(I,S),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I, {I,Ti,R,Kir}k(I,S),
                         {S,Ts,I,Kir}k(R,S),
                         {R,Nr}Kir,
                         {I,{Nr}succ}Kir,

spdl/SPORE/wmf.spdl

@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ protocol wmf^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Ti,Ts: ExpiredTimeStamp;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I, {I,Ti,R,Kir}k(I,S),
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I, {I,Ti,R,Kir}k(I,S),
                         {S,Ts,I,Kir}k(R,S),
                         Kir
                );

spdl/SPORE/woo-lam.spdl

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ protocol woolam^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,N1,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,N1,
                         R,N2,
                         {I,R,N1,N2}k(I,S),
                         {I,R,N1,N2}k(R,S),

spdl/SPORE/yahalom-ban.spdl

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
                         R,Nr,{I,Ni}k(R,S),
                         Nr,{R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S),
                         {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S),

spdl/SPORE/yahalom-paulson.spdl

@@ -11,26 +11,26 @@ const Compromised: Function;
 
 usertype SessionKey;
 
-protocol yahalom-Paulson^KeyCompromise(C)
+//protocol yahalom-Paulson^KeyCompromise(C)
-{
+//{
-    // Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
+//    // Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
-    // corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
+//    // corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
-    role C {
+//    role C {
-        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
+//        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
-        const Kir: SessionKey;
+//        const Kir: SessionKey;
-        var I,R,S: Agent;
+//        var I,R,S: Agent;
-
+//
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+//        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
+//        send_!C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
-                        R,Nr,{I,Ni}k(R,S),
+//                        R,Nr,{I,Ni}k(R,S),
-                        Nr,{R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S),
+//                        Nr,{R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S),
-                        {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S),
+//                        {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S),
-                        {Nr}Kir,
+//                        {Nr}Kir,
-                        Kir
+//                        Kir
-               );
+//               );
-        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
+//        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
-    }
+//    }
-}
+//}
 
 
 protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)

spdl/SPORE/yahalom.spdl

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ protocol yahalom^KeyCompromise(C)
         const Kir: SessionKey;
         var I,R,S: Agent;
 
-        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
+        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
-        send_C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
+        send_!C2(C,C,    I,Ni,
                         R,{I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S),
                         {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S),
                         {I,Kir}k(R,S),

spdl/misc/bkepk-ce2.spdl

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ protocol bkepkCE2(A,B,testnonce)
 	{
 		var n: Nonce;
 
-		read_4 (testnonce,testnonce, n);
+		read_!4 (testnonce,testnonce, n);
 	}
 }
 

spdl/misc/bunava-1-3.spdl

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
         var T: Ticket;
 	var R0,R1: Agent;
 
-	read_1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
+	read_!1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
-	send_2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
+	send_!2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
     }
 }
 

spdl/misc/bunava-1-4.spdl

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
         var T: Ticket;
 	var A,B: Agent;
 
-	read_1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(A,B) );
+	read_!1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(A,B) );
-	send_2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(B,A) );
+	send_!2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(B,A) );
     }
 }
 

spdl/misc/bunava-2-3.spdl

@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ protocol intruderhelp(Swap)
         var T: Ticket;
 	var R0,R1: Agent;
 
-	read_1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
+	read_!1(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R0,R1) );
-	send_2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
+	send_!2(Swap,Swap, { T }k(R1,R0) );
     }
 }
 

spdl/misc/f4.spdl

@@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ protocol f4(I,R)
 	{
 		var nr: Nonce;
 
-		read_1(R,I, nr );
+		read_!1(R,I, nr );
-		send_2(I,R, { nr }sk(I) );
+		send_!2(I,R, { nr }sk(I) );
-		read_3(R,I, {{{{ nr }sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R) );
+		read_!3(R,I, {{{{ nr }sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R) );
 
-		claim_i1(I,Niagree);
+		claim_i1(I,Reachable);
 	}	
 
 	role R
 	{
 		const nr: Nonce;
-		send_1(R,I, nr );
+		send_!1(R,I, nr );
 	}
 	
 }
@@ -40,9 +40,3 @@ untrusted Eve;
 const ne: Nonce;
 compromised sk(Eve);
 
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);

spdl/misc/f5.spdl

@@ -13,23 +13,23 @@ const pk: Function;
 secret sk: Function;
 inversekeys (pk,sk);
 
-protocol f4(I,R)
+protocol f5(I,R)
 {
 	role I
 	{
 		var nr: Nonce;
 
-		read_1(R,I, nr );
+		read_!1(R,I, nr );
-		send_2(I,R, { nr }sk(I) );
+		send_!2(I,R, { nr }sk(I) );
-		read_3(R,I, {{{{{ nr }sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R) );
+		read_!3(R,I, {{{{{ nr }sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R)}sk(R) );
 
-		claim_i1(I,Niagree);
+		claim_i1(I,Reachable);
 	}	
 
 	role R
 	{
 		const nr: Nonce;
-		send_1(R,I, nr );
+		send_!1(R,I, nr );
 	}
 	
 }
@@ -40,9 +40,3 @@ untrusted Eve;
 const ne: Nonce;
 compromised sk(Eve);
 
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);
-run f4.I(Agent,Agent);

spdl/misc/five-run-bound.spdl

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ protocol r5bound(I,R)
 		var ni: Nonce;
 		const k2: Nonce;
 
-		read_1 (I,R, ni );
+		read_!1 (I,R, ni );
-		send_2 (R,I, { ni }sk(R) );
+		send_!2 (R,I, { ni }sk(R) );
-		read_3 (I,R, {{{ {k1}pk(R) }sk(I)}sk(I)}sk(I) );
+		read_!3 (I,R, {{{ {k1}pk(R) }sk(I)}sk(I)}sk(I) );
-		send_4 (R,I, {k2}k1 );
+		send_!4 (R,I, {k2}k1 );
 
 		claim_6 (R, Secret, k2);
 	}
@@ -22,11 +22,3 @@ protocol r5bound(I,R)
 const Alice, Bob: Agent;
 const ne: Nonce;
 
-run r5bound.R(Agent);
-run r5bound.R(Agent);
-
-run r5bound.R(Agent);
-run r5bound.R(Agent);
-
-run r5bound.R(Agent);
-run r5bound.R(Agent);

spdl/misc/nsl7.spdl

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-const pk: Function;
-secret sk: Function;
-inversekeys (pk,sk);
-
-protocol nsl7(I,R)
-{
-	role R
-	{
-		var ni;
-		const nr;
-
-		read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
-		send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
-		read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
-		claim_4(R,Secret,ni);
-		claim_5(R,Secret,nr);
-	}
-}
-
-const Alice,Bob,Eve;
-const ne;
-untrusted Eve;
-compromised sk(Eve);
-
-run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);
-run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);

spdl/misc/onetrace.spdl

@@ -9,22 +9,10 @@ protocol onetrace(I)
 	{
 		var input: String;
 
-		read_1(I,I, input);
+		read_!1(I,I, input);
-		send_2(I,I, Hallo);
+		send_!2(I,I, Hallo);
-		read_3(I,I, input);
+		read_!3(I,I, input);
 		claim_4(I, Secret, input);
 	}
 }
 
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-
-run onetrace.I(Alice);
-run onetrace.I(Alice);

spdl/misc/samasc-broken.spdl

@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ protocol samascbroken(I,R)
 		const nr: Nonce;
 		var kir: Key;
 
-		read_1a (I,R, { kir,I }pk(R) );
+		read_!1a (I,R, { kir,I }pk(R) );
-		send_1b (R,I, {nr,R}pk(I) );
+		send_!1b (R,I, {nr,R}pk(I) );
 
 		/* Commenting out these two lines yields an attack: */
-		read_2a (I,R, { nr }kir );
+		read_!2a (I,R, { nr }kir );
-		send_2b (R,I, { I,R,nr }kir );
+		send_!2b (R,I, { I,R,nr }kir );
 
-		read_3 (I,R, { I,R }kir );
+		read_!3 (I,R, { I,R }kir );
 
 		claim_4 (R, Secret, kir );
 	}

spdl/misc/simplest.spdl

@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@ protocol simplest(I)
 		var x: Nonce;
 		const n: Nonce;
 
-		read_1(I,I, x);
+		read_!1(I,I, x);
-		send_2(I,I, n, {n, x}k );
+		send_!2(I,I, n, {n, x}k );
 		claim_3(I, Secret, n);
 	}
 }
 
-run simplest.I(Alice);
-run simplest.I(Alice);

spdl/misc/woolam-ce.spdl

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-usertype Server, SessionKey, Token, SymmetricKey;
-secret k: Function;
-
-const Alice, Bob, Charlie, Eve: Agent;
-const Simon: Server;
-
-/* give the intruder something to work with */
-const ne: Nonce;
-const ke: SessionKey;
-untrusted Eve;
-compromised k(Eve,Simon);
-
-const authToken: Token;
-
-protocol woolamce(A,B,S)
-{
-	role B
-	{
-		var Na: Nonce;
-		const Nb: Nonce;
-		var Kab: SessionKey;
-		var Kas : SymmetricKey;
-
-		read_1(A,B, A,Na);
-		send_2(B,A, B,Nb);
-		read_3(A,B, { A,(B,(Na,Nb)) }Kas );
-		send_4(B,S, { A,(B,(Na,Nb)) }Kas, { A,(B,(Na,Nb)) }k(B,S) );
-		read_5(S,B, { B,(Na,(Nb,Kab)) }Kas, { A,(Na,(Nb,Kab)) }k(B,S) );
-   		send_6(B,A, { B,(Na,(Nb,Kab)) }Kas, { Na,Nb }Kab );
-		read_7(A,B, { Nb }Kab );	
-
-		claim_8(B,Secret,authToken);
-	}
-}
-
-run woolamce.B(Agent,Agent,Simon);
-run woolamce.B(Agent,Agent,Simon);
-

spdl/misc/yahalom.spdl

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-// Yahalom protocol
-
-const a,b,s : Agent;
-secret k : Function;
-
-usertype Nonce, Ticket, SessionKey;
-
-
-protocol yahalom(A,B,S)
-{
-	role A
-	{
-		const na: Nonce;
-		var nb: Nonce;
-		var ticket: Ticket;
-		var kab: SessionKey;
-
-		send_1(A,B, A,na);
-		read_3(S,A, nb, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S), ticket );
-		send_4(A,B, ticket, {nb}kab );
-
-		claim_5(A, Secret,kab);
-	}
-
-	role B
-	{
-		const nb: Nonce;
-		var na: Nonce;
-		var ticket: Ticket;
-		var kab: SessionKey;
-
-		read_1(A,B, A,na);
-		send_2(B,S, B,nb, {A,na,nb}k(B,S) );
-		read_4(A,B, {A,kab}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
-
-		claim_6(B, Secret,kab);
-	}
-
-	role S
-	{
-		const kab: SessionKey;
-		var na,nb: Nonce;
-
-		read_2(B,S, B,nb, {A,na}k(B,S) );
-		send_3(S,A, nb, {B,kab,na,nb}k(A,S), {A,kab}k(B,S) );
-	}
-}
-
-run yahalom.A(Agent,Agent,s);
-run yahalom.A(Agent,Agent,s);
-run yahalom.B(Agent,Agent,s);
-run yahalom.B(Agent,Agent,s);
-run yahalom.S(Agent,Agent,s);
-

src/compiler.c

@@ -2008,6 +2008,7 @@ checkLabelMatchThis (const System sys, const Protocol p, const Role readrole,
    */
   if (found == 0)
     {
+      globalError++;
       eprintf ("error: for the read event ");
       roledefPrint (readevent);
       eprintf (" of protocol ");
@@ -2015,6 +2016,7 @@ checkLabelMatchThis (const System sys, const Protocol p, const Role readrole,
       eprintf
 	(" there is no corresponding send event (with the same label and matching content). Start the label name with '!' if this is intentional.\n");
       error_die ();
+      globalError--;
     }
 }
 
@@ -2048,10 +2050,12 @@ checkLabelMatchProtocol (const System sys, const Protocol p)
 		}
 	      else
 		{
+		  globalError++;
 		  eprintf ("error: cannot determine label information for ");
 		  roledefPrint (rd);
 		  eprintf ("\n");
 		  error_die ();
+		  globalError--;
 		}
 	    }
 	  rd = rd->next;