- Adding CJ modified version of splice protocol

- Adding tmn
- Fixed a modelling error in splice
This commit is contained in:
gijs 2005-05-18 11:43:42 +00:00
parent ee3b996ff7
commit cbb617b3a1
4 changed files with 168 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/spliceas3.html
#
# Note:
# The assumptions made here do not comply with those in SPORE
# SPORE assumes that the agents do not know the pk function, but only
# their own public key values.
# This can currently not be modelled.
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec);
protocol spliceASCJ(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const N1,N2: Nonce;
const T: TimeStamp;
const L: LifeTime;
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
claim_9(I, Niagree);
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
}
role S
{
var N1,N3: Nonce;
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
}
role R
{
const N3: Nonce;
var N2: Nonce;
var T: TimeStamp;
var L: LifeTime;
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
claim_11(R, Niagree);
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run spliceASCJI(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceASCJR(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceASCJS(Agent,Agent,Agent);
#run spliceASCJ.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceASCJ.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceASCJ.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);

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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec);
protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
protocol spliceASHC(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(R) );
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
@ -62,14 +62,18 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
}
}
const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run spliceAS.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
#run spliceASHC.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceASHC.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceASHC.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
run spliceASHC.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceASHC.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceASHC.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);

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@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/spliceas.html
#
# Note:
# The assumptions made here do not comply with those in SPORE
# SPORE assumes that the agents do not know the pk function, but only
# their own public key values.
# This can currently not be modelled.
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
@ -23,7 +28,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(R) );
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
@ -62,7 +67,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
}
}
const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
@ -72,4 +77,7 @@ run spliceAS.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
run spliceAS.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
#run spliceAS.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceAS.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run spliceAS.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);

65
spdl/SPORE/tmn.spdl Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
# TMN
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/tmn.html
#
usertype Key;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
protocol tmn(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const Ki: Key;
var Kr: Key;
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki);
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr);
}
role R
{
const Kr: Key;
read_2(S,R, I );
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
}
role S
{
var Ki,Kr: Key;
read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
send_2(S,R, I );
read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: Key;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
# Scenario to recreate an attack in SPORE
#run tmn.I (Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run tmn.R (Alice,Bob,Simon);
#run tmn.S (Alice,Bob,Simon);
run tmn.I (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run tmn.R (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run tmn.S (Agent,Agent,Simon);