- Adding CJ modified version of splice protocol
- Adding tmn - Fixed a modelling error in splice
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spdl/SPORE/splice-as-cj.spdl
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83
spdl/SPORE/splice-as-cj.spdl
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# Clark and Jacob modified Hwang and Chen modified SPLICE/AS
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/spliceas3.html
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#
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# Note:
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# The assumptions made here do not comply with those in SPORE
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# SPORE assumes that the agents do not know the pk function, but only
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# their own public key values.
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# This can currently not be modelled.
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usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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const inc,dec: Function;
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inversekeys (inc,dec);
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protocol spliceASCJ(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const N1,N2: Nonce;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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const L: LifeTime;
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send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
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read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
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send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
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read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
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claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
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claim_9(I, Niagree);
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claim_10(I, Nisynch);
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}
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role S
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{
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var N1,N3: Nonce;
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read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
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send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
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read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
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send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
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}
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role R
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{
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const N3: Nonce;
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var N2: Nonce;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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var L: LifeTime;
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
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send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
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read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
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send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
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claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
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claim_11(R, Niagree);
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claim_12(R, Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run spliceASCJI(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceASCJR(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceASCJS(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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#run spliceASCJ.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceASCJ.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceASCJ.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ inversekeys (pk,sk);
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const inc,dec: Function;
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inversekeys (inc,dec);
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protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
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protocol spliceASHC(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
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send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
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read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
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send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(R) );
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send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
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read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
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claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
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@ -62,14 +62,18 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
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}
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}
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const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run spliceAS.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAS.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAS.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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#run spliceASHC.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceASHC.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceASHC.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run spliceASHC.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceASHC.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceASHC.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/spliceas.html
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#
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# Note:
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# The assumptions made here do not comply with those in SPORE
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# SPORE assumes that the agents do not know the pk function, but only
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# their own public key values.
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# This can currently not be modelled.
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usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
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@ -23,7 +28,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
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send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
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read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
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send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(R) );
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send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
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read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
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claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
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@ -62,7 +67,7 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
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}
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}
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const Al,Bo,Eve: Agent;
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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@ -72,4 +77,7 @@ run spliceAS.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAS.R(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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run spliceAS.S(Agent,Agent,Agent);
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#run spliceAS.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceAS.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run spliceAS.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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65
spdl/SPORE/tmn.spdl
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65
spdl/SPORE/tmn.spdl
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# TMN
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/tmn.html
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#
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usertype Key;
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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protocol tmn(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ki: Key;
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var Kr: Key;
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send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
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read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
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claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki);
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claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr);
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}
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role R
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{
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const Kr: Key;
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read_2(S,R, I );
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send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
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claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
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}
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role S
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{
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var Ki,Kr: Key;
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read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
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send_2(S,R, I );
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read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
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send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: Key;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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# Scenario to recreate an attack in SPORE
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#run tmn.I (Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run tmn.R (Alice,Bob,Simon);
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#run tmn.S (Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run tmn.I (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run tmn.R (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run tmn.S (Agent,Agent,Simon);
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