- Remove some small modelling errors
- New way to model Neumann Stub (it should be 2 distinct protocols)
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ protocol denningSaccoSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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role C {
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: Ticket;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ protocol kaochow2SessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
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{I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
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R, Nr,
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R, Nr,
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{Nr,Kir}Kt,
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{Nr,Kir}Kt,
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Kir,
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Kir
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Kt
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// Kt
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);
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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// claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ protocol kaochow3SessionKeyCompromise(C)
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Nr,
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Nr,
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{I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
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{I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
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{Nr,Kir}Kt,
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{Nr,Kir}Kt,
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Kir,
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Kir
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Kt
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// Kt
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);
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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// claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -12,15 +12,14 @@
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usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, TicketKey;
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usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, TicketKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(e,s);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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{
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@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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send_C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
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send_C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
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(Ni,I,Nr,R),
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(Ni,I,Nr,R),
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{Nr,I,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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{Nr,I,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}k(I,R),
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}Kir,
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{Nc}Kir,
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{Nc}Kir,
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Ma,
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Ma,
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Mb,{Ma}Kir,
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Mb,{Ma}Kir,
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@ -51,22 +50,22 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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}
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}
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protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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protocol ksl(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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role A
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role I
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{
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{
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const Na, Ma: Nonce;
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const Ni, Mi: Nonce;
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var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
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var Nr2, Mr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(A,B, Na, A);
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send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
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read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
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read_4(R,I, {Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S), T, Nr2, {Ni}Kir);
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send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
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send_5(I,R, {Nr2}Kir );
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send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
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send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
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read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
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read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
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send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
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send_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
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claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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@ -77,8 +76,8 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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role B
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role B
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{
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{
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var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
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const Nr,Nr2,Mr: Nonce;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
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const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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var T: Ticket;
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@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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run ksl.A(a,b,s);
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run ksl.A(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.B(a,b,s);
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run ksl.B(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.S(a,b,s);
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run ksl.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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@ -7,20 +7,23 @@
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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#
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# Note:
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# In SPORE this protocol is not described correctly, there are in fact 2
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# different protocols (the key establishment protocol and the repeated
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# authentication protocol)
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(e,s);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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{
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@ -47,12 +50,52 @@ protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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protocol neustubRepeat(I,R,S)
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{
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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role I
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{
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const Mi: Nonce;
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var Mr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Tr: TimeStamp;
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send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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const Mr: Nonce;
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var Tr: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Mi: Nonce;
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read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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}
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}
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protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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role I
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role I
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{
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{
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const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
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const Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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@ -60,9 +103,6 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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@ -81,9 +121,6 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
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send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
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read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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@ -102,7 +139,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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run neustub.A(a,b,s);
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run neustub.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run neustub.B(a,b,s);
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run neustub.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run neustub.S(a,b,s);
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run neustub.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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