- Remove some small modelling errors
- New way to model Neumann Stub (it should be 2 distinct protocols)
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				@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ protocol denningSaccoSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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    role C {
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					    role C {
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        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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					        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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        const Kir: SessionKey;
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					        const Kir: SessionKey;
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        const T: Ticket;
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					        const T: TimeStamp;
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        var I,R,S: Agent;
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					        var I,R,S: Agent;
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        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
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					        read_C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
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@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ protocol kaochow2SessionKeyCompromise(C)
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                        {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
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					                        {I,R,Ni,Kir,Kt}k(R,S),
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                        R, Nr,
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					                        R, Nr,
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                        {Nr,Kir}Kt,
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					                        {Nr,Kir}Kt,
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                        Kir,
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					                        Kir
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                        Kt
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					         //               Kt
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               );
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					               );
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        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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					        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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        claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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					        // claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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    }
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					    }
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}
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					}
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@ -32,11 +32,11 @@ protocol kaochow3SessionKeyCompromise(C)
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                        Nr,
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					                        Nr,
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                        {I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
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					                        {I,R,T2,Kir}k(R,S),
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                        {Nr,Kir}Kt,
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					                        {Nr,Kir}Kt,
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                        Kir,
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					                        Kir
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                        Kt
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					                        // Kt
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               );
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					               );
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        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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					        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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        claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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					        // claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kt));
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    }
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					    }
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}
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					}
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@ -12,15 +12,14 @@
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usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, TicketKey;
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					usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, TicketKey;
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secret k: Function;
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					secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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					const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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					const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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					const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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					const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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					const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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					untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(e,s);
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					compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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					protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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					{
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@ -37,7 +36,7 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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        send_C2(C,C,    (Ni,I),
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					        send_C2(C,C,    (Ni,I),
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                        (Ni,I,Nr,R),
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					                        (Ni,I,Nr,R),
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                        {Nr,I,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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					                        {Nr,I,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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                        {Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}k(I,R),
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					                        {Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}Kir,
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                        {Nc}Kir,
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					                        {Nc}Kir,
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                        Ma,
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					                        Ma,
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                        Mb,{Ma}Kir,
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					                        Mb,{Ma}Kir,
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@ -51,22 +50,22 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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}
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					}
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protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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					protocol ksl(I,R,S)
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{
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					{
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    role A
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					    role I
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    {
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					    {
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        const Na, Ma: Nonce;
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					        const Ni, Mi: Nonce;
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        var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
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					        var Nr2, Mr: Nonce;
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        var T: Ticket;
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					        var T: Ticket;
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        var Kab: SessionKey;
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					        var Kir: SessionKey;
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        send_1(A,B, Na, A);
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					        send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
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        read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
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					        read_4(R,I, {Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S), T, Nr2, {Ni}Kir);
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        send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
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					        send_5(I,R, {Nr2}Kir );
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        send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
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					        send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
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        read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
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					        read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
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        send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
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					        send_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
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        claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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					        claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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        claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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					        claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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@ -77,8 +76,8 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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    role B
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					    role B
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    {
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					    {
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        var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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					        var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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        const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
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					        const Nr,Nr2,Mr: Nonce;
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        var Kab: SessionKey;
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					        var Kir: SessionKey;
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        const Kbb: TicketKey;
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					        const Kbb: TicketKey;
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        const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
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					        const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
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        var T: Ticket;
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					        var T: Ticket;
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@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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    }
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					    }
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}
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					}
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run ksl.A(a,b,s);
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					run ksl.A(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.B(a,b,s);
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					run ksl.B(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.S(a,b,s);
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					run ksl.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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@ -7,20 +7,23 @@
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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					# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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					# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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					#
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					# Note:
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					# In SPORE this protocol is not described correctly, there are in fact 2
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					# different protocols (the key establishment protocol and the repeated
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					# authentication protocol)
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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					usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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secret k: Function;
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					secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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					const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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					const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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					const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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					const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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					const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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					untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(e,s);
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					compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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					protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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					{
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@ -47,12 +50,52 @@ protocol neustubSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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    }
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					    }
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}
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					}
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					protocol neustubRepeat(I,R,S)
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					{
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					    const Kir: SessionKey;
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					    role I
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					    {
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					        const Mi: Nonce;
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					        var Mr: Nonce;
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					        const Kir: SessionKey;
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					        const Tr: TimeStamp;
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					        send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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					        read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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					        send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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					        claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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					        claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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					        claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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					        claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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					    }
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					    role R
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					    {
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					        const Mr: Nonce;
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					        var Tr: TimeStamp;
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					        var Kir: SessionKey;
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					        var Mi: Nonce;
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					        read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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					        send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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					        read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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					        claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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					        claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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					        claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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					        claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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					    }
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					    role S 
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					    {
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					    }
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					}
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protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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					protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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{
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					{
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    role I
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					    role I
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    {
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					    {
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        const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
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					        const Ni: Nonce;
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        var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
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					        var Nr: Nonce;
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        var T: Ticket;
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					        var T: Ticket;
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        var Tb: TimeStamp;
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					        var Tb: TimeStamp;
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        var Kir: SessionKey;
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					        var Kir: SessionKey;
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@ -60,9 +103,6 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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        send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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					        send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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        read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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					        read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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        send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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					        send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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        send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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        read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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        send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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        claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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					        claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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        claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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					        claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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@ -81,9 +121,6 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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        read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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					        read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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        send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
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					        send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
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        read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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					        read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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        read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
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        send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
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        read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
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        claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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					        claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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        claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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					        claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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@ -102,7 +139,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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    }
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					    }
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}
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					}
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run neustub.A(a,b,s);
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					run neustub.I(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run neustub.B(a,b,s);
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					run neustub.R(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run neustub.S(a,b,s);
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					run neustub.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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