Tried to model Guttman variants, found multi-protocol attack.
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@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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read_!3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
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send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
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send_!chain(I,R, { R,Tb,Kir }k(I,S), T);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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@ -48,12 +50,15 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Tb: TimeStamp;
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const Tb: TimeStamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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var T: Ticket;
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const g: Ticket;
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read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
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send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
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send_!2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, g}k(R,S),Nr);
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read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R5(R,Secret, g);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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@ -65,7 +70,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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var Tb: TimeStamp;
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read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
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var g: Ticket;
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read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb, g}k(R,S), Nr);
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send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
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send_!3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -29,12 +29,21 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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const Mi: Nonce;
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const Mi: Nonce;
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var Mr: Nonce;
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var Mr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Tr: TimeStamp;
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var Tr: TimeStamp;
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send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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var Tb: Ticket;
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read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
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const g: Ticket;
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var h: Ticket;
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read_!chain(R,I, { R,Tr,Kir }k(I,S), Tb);
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send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S),g);
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read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr,g,h}Kir);
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send_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
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send_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
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claim_I0(I,Secret, g);
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claim_I5(I,Secret, h);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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@ -47,11 +56,17 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
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var Tr: TimeStamp;
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var Tr: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Mi: Nonce;
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var Mi: Nonce;
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var g: Ticket;
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const h: Ticket;
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read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
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read_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S),g);
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send_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
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send_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr,g,h}Kir);
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read_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
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read_7(I,R,{I,Mr}Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R5(R,Secret, g);
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claim_R6(R,Secret, h);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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