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- Some cleanups of the protocols list.

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This commit is contained in:
ccremers 2004-11-18 13:15:19 +00:00
parent 7d24d3396d
commit a3d59f591a
10 changed files with 23 additions and 312 deletions
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58
spdl/bke-ordertest.spdl
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
/*
Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key protocol (BKEPK)
*/
usertype Key;
const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
inversekeys (hash,unhash);
protocol bkepk(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
var kir: Key;
send_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
read_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
send_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
claim_4 (I, Secret, kir );
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
const kir: Key;
read_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
send_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
read_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
claim_5 (R, Secret, kir );
}
}
const a,b,e: Agent;
untrusted e;
compromised sk(e);
const ne: Nonce;
run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
run bkepk.R(Agent,b);

47
spdl/ns3-extreme.spdl
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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
/* something like this will later on all be implied by 'untrusted Eve' */
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
/* pre-defined 10 runs, limit using --max-runs parameters */
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);

41
spdl/ns3-nisynch.spdl
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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
claim_5(I,Secret, ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_6(R,Nisynch);
claim_7(R,Secret, ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);

37
spdl/ns3-var.spdl
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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3var(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve : Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run ns3var.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3var.R(Agent,Agent);

16
spdl/ns3.spdl
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@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) ); read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr); claim_i1(I,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_6(I,Nisynch); claim_i2(I,Niagree);
claim_i3(I,Nisynch);
} }
role R role R
@ -24,16 +25,17 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr); claim_r1(R,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_7(R,Nisynch); claim_r2(R,Niagree);
claim_r3(R,Nisynch);
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve; untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce; const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve); compromised sk(Eve);
run ns3.I(Alice,Eve); run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Alice,Bob); run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);

35
spdl/nsl3-2m.spdl
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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol nsl3x2m(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl3x2m.I(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3x2m.R(Alice,Bob);

41
spdl/nsl3-nisynch.spdl
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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol nsl3(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_6(R,Nisynch);
claim_7(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);

37
spdl/nsl3-var.spdl
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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol nsl3(I,R)
{
role I
{
const ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
{
var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);

14
spdl/nsl3.spdl
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@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr); claim_i1(I,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_6(I,Nisynch); claim_i2(I,Niagree);
claim_i3(I,Nisynch);
} }
role R role R
@ -24,16 +25,17 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) ); read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr); claim_r1(R,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_7(R,Nisynch); claim_r2(R,Niagree);
claim_r3(R,Nisynch);
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve; untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce; const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve); compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent); run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
run nsl3.R(Alice,Bob); run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);

9
spdl/nsl7.spdl
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@ -16,7 +16,10 @@ protocol nsl7(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob; const Alice,Bob,Eve;
const ne;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob); run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);
run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob); run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);