- Some cleanups of the protocols list.
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@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
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/*
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Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key protocol (BKEPK)
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*/
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usertype Key;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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inversekeys (hash,unhash);
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protocol bkepk(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir: Key;
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send_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
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read_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
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send_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
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claim_4 (I, Secret, kir );
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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const kir: Key;
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read_1 (I,R, { ni,I }pk(R) );
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send_2 (R,I, { hash(ni),nr,R,kir }pk(I) );
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read_3 (I,R, { hash(nr) }kir );
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claim_5 (R, Secret, kir );
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}
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}
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const a,b,e: Agent;
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untrusted e;
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compromised sk(e);
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const ne: Nonce;
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run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
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run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
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run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
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run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
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run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
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run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
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run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
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run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
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run bkepk.I(a,Agent);
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run bkepk.R(Agent,b);
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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol ns3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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/* something like this will later on all be implied by 'untrusted Eve' */
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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/* pre-defined 10 runs, limit using --max-runs parameters */
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol ns3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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claim_5(I,Secret, ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_6(R,Nisynch);
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claim_7(R,Secret, ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol ns3var(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve : Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run ns3var.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3var.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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claim_i1(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_i2(I,Niagree);
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claim_i3(I,Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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@ -24,16 +25,17 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_7(R,Nisynch);
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claim_r1(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_r2(R,Niagree);
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claim_r3(R,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run ns3.I(Alice,Eve);
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run ns3.R(Alice,Bob);
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run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol nsl3x2m(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run nsl3x2m.I(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3x2m.R(Alice,Bob);
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol nsl3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_6(R,Nisynch);
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claim_7(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol nsl3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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claim_i1(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_i2(I,Niagree);
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claim_i3(I,Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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@ -24,16 +25,17 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_7(R,Nisynch);
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claim_r1(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_r2(R,Niagree);
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claim_r3(R,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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const ne: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl3.R(Alice,Bob);
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run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);
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@ -16,7 +16,10 @@ protocol nsl7(I,R)
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob;
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const Alice,Bob,Eve;
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const ne;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob);
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run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob);
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run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);
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run nsl7.R(Agent,Agent);
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