Added Wimax models from compositionality paper.
Previously we had not included the IEEE 802.16e Wimax PKM models to the Scyther distribution, although the models had been around for years.
This commit is contained in:
Cas Cremers
parent
ae155f8169
commit
7a2d354bac
46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsa.spdl
Normal file
46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsa.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-RSA
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol pkmv2rsa(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand, said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand, said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsacorrected.spdl
Normal file
46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsacorrected.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-RSA
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol pkmv2rsa(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand, said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand,BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand, said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand,BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
63
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2satek.spdl
Normal file
63
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2satek.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-SA-TEK
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Setup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
hashfunction hash;
|
||||||
|
hashfunction prepak;
|
||||||
|
const akid;
|
||||||
|
const u,d;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol pkmv2satek(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand': Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS)),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS))));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand': Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS)),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS))));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
84
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pqr.spdl
Normal file
84
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pqr.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-RSA
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Setup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
hashfunction hash;
|
||||||
|
hashfunction prepak;
|
||||||
|
const akid;
|
||||||
|
const u,d;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand, msrand', said, c: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1, tek2, tek3: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_tekup1(MS,BS,{c}hash(prepak));
|
||||||
|
recv_tekup2(BS,MS,{c,tek2,tek3}hash(prepak));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar8(MS,SKR,tek2);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar9(MS,SKR,tek3);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand, msrand', said, c: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1, tek2, tek3: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_tekup1(MS,BS,{c}hash(prepak));
|
||||||
|
send_tekup2(BS,MS,{c,tek2,tek3}hash(prepak));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar8(BS,SKR,tek2);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar9(BS,SKR,tek3);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
74
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatek.spdl
Normal file
74
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatek.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-RSA
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Setup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
hashfunction hash;
|
||||||
|
hashfunction prepak;
|
||||||
|
const akid;
|
||||||
|
const u,d;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
// claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
73
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatekcorrected.spdl
Normal file
73
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatekcorrected.spdl
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
|||||||
|
/*
|
||||||
|
* PKMv2-RSA
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
|
||||||
|
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
|
||||||
|
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
|
||||||
|
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
|
||||||
|
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
|
||||||
|
* Elsevier, 2008.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Setup
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
hashfunction hash;
|
||||||
|
hashfunction prepak;
|
||||||
|
const akid;
|
||||||
|
const u,d;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The protocol description
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
role MS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
fresh msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
role BS
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
var msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
|
||||||
|
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
|
||||||
|
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
|
||||||
|
send_satek3(BS,MS,
|
||||||
|
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
|
||||||
|
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
|
||||||
|
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user