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Added Wimax models from compositionality paper.

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Previously we had not included the IEEE 802.16e Wimax PKM models to the
Scyther distribution, although the models had been around for years.
This commit is contained in:
Cas Cremers 2012-11-27 21:55:54 +01:00
parent ae155f8169
commit 7a2d354bac
6 changed files with 386 additions and 0 deletions
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46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsa.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-RSA
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// The protocol description
protocol pkmv2rsa(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand, said: Nonce;
var prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
}
role BS
{
var msrand, said: Nonce;
fresh prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
}
}

46
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2rsacorrected.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-RSA
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// The protocol description
protocol pkmv2rsa(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand, said: Nonce;
var prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand,BS}sk(MS) );
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
}
role BS
{
var msrand, said: Nonce;
fresh prepak, bsrand: Nonce;
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand,BS}sk(MS) );
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
}
}

63
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pkmv2satek.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-SA-TEK
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// Setup
hashfunction hash;
hashfunction prepak;
const akid;
const u,d;
// The protocol description
protocol pkmv2satek(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand': Nonce;
var bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS)),
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS))));
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
}
role BS
{
var msrand': Nonce;
fresh bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak(MS,BS),BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
send_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS)),
hash(d,prepak(MS,BS),msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak(MS,BS))));
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
}
}

84
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/pqr.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-RSA
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// Setup
hashfunction hash;
hashfunction prepak;
const akid;
const u,d;
// The protocol description
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand, msrand', said, c: Nonce;
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1, tek2, tek3: Nonce;
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
send_tekup1(MS,BS,{c}hash(prepak));
recv_tekup2(BS,MS,{c,tek2,tek3}hash(prepak));
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
claim_rsar8(MS,SKR,tek2);
claim_rsar9(MS,SKR,tek3);
}
role BS
{
var msrand, msrand', said, c: Nonce;
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1, tek2, tek3: Nonce;
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
send_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
recv_tekup1(MS,BS,{c}hash(prepak));
send_tekup2(BS,MS,{c,tek2,tek3}hash(prepak));
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
claim_rsar8(BS,SKR,tek2);
claim_rsar9(BS,SKR,tek3);
}
}

74
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatek.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-RSA
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// Setup
hashfunction hash;
hashfunction prepak;
const akid;
const u,d;
// The protocol description
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
// claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
// claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
// claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
}
role BS
{
var msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand}sk(MS) );
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
send_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
// claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
// claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
// claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
}
}

73
gui/Protocols/IEEE-WIMAX/rsaplussatekcorrected.spdl Normal file
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/*
* PKMv2-RSA
*
* Initial model by: Sjouke Mauw, Sasa Radomirovic (2007)
* Model changes: Cas Cremers (Nov 2012)
*
* Analysed in: "A framework for compositional verification of security protocols"
* With S. Andova, K. Gjosteen, S. Mauw, S. Mjolsnes, and S. Radomirovic.
* Information and Computation, Special issue on Computer Security:
* Foundations and Automated Reasoning, Volume 206, Issues 2-4, pp. 425-459,
* Elsevier, 2008.
*/
// Setup
hashfunction hash;
hashfunction prepak;
const akid;
const u,d;
// The protocol description
protocol rsaplussatek(MS,BS)
{
role MS
{
fresh msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
var prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
send_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
recv_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
send_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
recv_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
send_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
claim_rsai3(MS,Niagree);
claim_rsai4(MS,Nisynch);
claim_rsai5(MS,SKR,prepak);
claim_rsai6(MS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsai7(MS,SKR,tek1);
}
role BS
{
var msrand, msrand', said: Nonce;
fresh prepak, bsrand, bsrand', tek0, tek1: Nonce;
recv_rsa1(MS,BS, {msrand, said, MS}sk(MS) );
send_rsa2(BS,MS, {msrand, bsrand,{prepak,MS}pk(MS),BS}sk(BS) );
recv_rsa3(MS,BS, {bsrand, BS}sk(MS) );
send_satek1(BS,MS, bsrand',akid,
hash(d,prepak,BS,MS,bsrand',akid) );
recv_satek2(MS,BS, msrand',bsrand',akid,
hash(u,prepak,BS,MS,msrand',bsrand',akid) );
send_satek3(BS,MS,
msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak),
hash(d,prepak,msrand',bsrand',akid,{tek0,tek1}hash(prepak)));
claim_rsar3(BS,Niagree);
claim_rsar4(BS,Nisynch);
claim_rsar5(BS,SKR,prepak);
claim_rsar6(BS,SKR,tek0);
claim_rsar7(BS,SKR,tek1);
}
}