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Large pass on protocol specification files to get rid of deprecated constructions.

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This commit is contained in:
Cas Cremers 2012-04-23 15:53:28 +02:00
parent 30006b732a
commit 755c4519c6
83 changed files with 165 additions and 940 deletions
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5
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/BKE.spdl
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@ -37,9 +37,4 @@ protocol bke(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/andrew-ban-concrete.spdl
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@ -65,9 +65,3 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;

11
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/andrew-ban.spdl
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@ -50,14 +50,3 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);

13
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/andrew-lowe-ban.spdl
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@ -55,16 +55,3 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/boyd.spdl
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@ -54,17 +54,3 @@ protocol boyd(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const mcsde: Macseed;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/ccitt509-ban3.spdl
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@ -37,9 +37,3 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

8
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl
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@ -63,12 +63,4 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

7
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/denning-sacco.spdl
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@ -51,12 +51,5 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/gong-nonce-b.spdl
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@ -58,17 +58,3 @@ protocol gongnonceb(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kpe: Keypart;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/gong-nonce.spdl
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@ -55,17 +55,3 @@ protocol gongnonce(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kpe: Keypart;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/isoiec11770-2-13.spdl
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@ -40,17 +40,3 @@ protocol isoiec11770213(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: Sessionkey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/kaochow-v2.spdl
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@ -53,17 +53,3 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/kaochow-v3.spdl
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@ -57,17 +57,3 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

14
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/kaochow.spdl
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@ -53,17 +53,3 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

15
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/ksl.spdl
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@ -9,21 +9,16 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
const a, b, e: Agent;
const s: Server;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);
protocol ksl(I,R,S) protocol ksl(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni, Mi: Nonce; fresh Ni, Mi: Nonce;
var Nc, Mr: Nonce; var Nc, Mr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -45,10 +40,10 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Kbb: TicketKey; fresh Kbb: TicketKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, Ni, I); read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
@ -70,7 +65,7 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R ); read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) ); send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );

7
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/needham-schroeder-sk-amend.spdl
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@ -64,10 +64,3 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/needham-schroeder-sk.spdl
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@ -54,9 +54,3 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

5
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/ns3.spdl
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@ -39,8 +39,3 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

5
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/nsl3.spdl
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@ -37,8 +37,3 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

5
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/otwayrees.spdl
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@ -54,8 +54,3 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice, Bob, Eve, Simon: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/soph.spdl
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@ -19,9 +19,3 @@ protocol soph(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/splice-as-cj.spdl
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@ -64,9 +64,3 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

11
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/splice-as-hc.spdl
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@ -7,9 +7,6 @@
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function; const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec); inversekeys (inc,dec);
@ -62,11 +59,3 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

6
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/splice-as.spdl
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@ -64,9 +64,3 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

9
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/tmn.spdl
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@ -49,12 +49,3 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

8
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/wmf-brutus.spdl
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@ -30,11 +30,3 @@ protocol wmfbrutus(A,B,S)
} }
} }
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
const Simon: Server;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

10
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/wmf-lowe.spdl
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@ -61,13 +61,3 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

10
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/wmf.spdl
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@ -52,13 +52,3 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

12
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/woo-lam-pi-1.spdl
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -39,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

12
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/woo-lam-pi-2.spdl
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -39,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

12
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/woo-lam-pi-3.spdl
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -39,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

8
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/woo-lam-pi-f.spdl
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@ -39,11 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

3
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/yahalom-ban-paulson-modified.spdl
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@ -9,9 +9,6 @@
usertype Server; usertype Server;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
const a,b,c : Agent;
const s : Server;
protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson-modified(A,B,S) protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson-modified(A,B,S)
{ {
role A role A

3
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/yahalom-ban-paulson.spdl
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@ -7,9 +7,6 @@
usertype Server; usertype Server;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
const a,b,c : Agent;
const s : Server;
protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson(A,B,S) protocol yahalom-BAN-Paulson(A,B,S)
{ {
role A role A

1
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/yahalom-ban.spdl
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@ -52,5 +52,4 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Charlie,David: Agent;

1
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/yahalom-lowe.spdl
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@ -50,5 +50,4 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;

7
gui/Protocols/MultiProtocolAttacks/yahalom.spdl
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@ -50,10 +50,3 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

13
gui/Protocols/andrew-ban-concrete.spdl
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@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -38,7 +37,7 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
@ -54,8 +53,8 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey; fresh kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R, I,ni ); read_1(I,R, I,ni );
send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
@ -67,9 +66,3 @@ protocol andrew-Concrete(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;

18
gui/Protocols/andrew-ban.spdl
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@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol # According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr,nr2: Nonce; var nr,nr2: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
@ -38,8 +37,8 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr,nr2: Nonce; fresh nr,nr2: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey; fresh kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
@ -53,14 +52,3 @@ protocol andrew-Ban(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);

20
gui/Protocols/andrew-lowe-ban.spdl
View File

@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
@ -43,8 +42,8 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey; fresh kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R, I,ni ); read_1(I,R, I,ni );
send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
@ -56,16 +55,3 @@ protocol andrew-LoweBan(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);

20
gui/Protocols/andrew.spdl
View File

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const succ: Function; const succ: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -19,7 +18,7 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr,nr2: Nonce; var nr,nr2: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
@ -36,8 +35,8 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr,nr2: Nonce; fresh nr,nr2: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey; fresh kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) ); send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
@ -50,16 +49,3 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);

15
gui/Protocols/ccitt509-1.spdl
View File

@ -9,17 +9,14 @@
# which can currently not be modelled in scyther # which can currently not be modelled in scyther
# #
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
usertype Timestamp; usertype Timestamp;
protocol ccitt509-1(I,R) protocol ccitt509-1(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ta: Timestamp; fresh Ta: Timestamp;
const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; fresh Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
# claim_2(I,Nisynch); # claim_2(I,Nisynch);
# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events # This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
@ -36,11 +33,3 @@ protocol ccitt509-1(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Timestamp;
compromised sk(Eve);

12
gui/Protocols/ccitt509-1c.spdl
View File

@ -7,10 +7,7 @@
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol # According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol
# #
const pk,hash: Function; hashfunction hash;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys (hash,unhash);
inversekeys(pk,sk);
usertype Timestamp; usertype Timestamp;
protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R) protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R)
@ -35,10 +32,3 @@ protocol ccitt509-1c(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Timestamp;
compromised sk(Eve);

18
gui/Protocols/ccitt509-3.spdl
View File

@ -8,18 +8,15 @@
# this can not be verified using scyther # this can not be verified using scyther
# #
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
usertype Timestamp; usertype Timestamp;
protocol ccitt509-3(I,R) protocol ccitt509-3(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ta: Timestamp; fresh Ta: Timestamp;
var Tb: Timestamp; var Tb: Timestamp;
const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; fresh Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce; var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
@ -32,9 +29,9 @@ protocol ccitt509-3(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var Ta: Timestamp; var Ta: Timestamp;
const Tb: Timestamp; fresh Tb: Timestamp;
var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce; fresh Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
@ -46,10 +43,3 @@ protocol ccitt509-3(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Timestamp;
compromised sk(Eve);

10
gui/Protocols/ccitt509-ban3.spdl
View File

@ -11,10 +11,6 @@
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol # According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol
# #
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R) protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
@ -41,9 +37,3 @@ protocol ccitt509-ban3(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

16
gui/Protocols/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl
View File

@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ usertype Key;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
usertype TimeStamp; usertype TimeStamp;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
usertype PseudoFunction; usertype PseudoFunction;
const dec: PseudoFunction; const dec: PseudoFunction;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
@ -41,7 +40,7 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: TimeStamp; var T: TimeStamp;
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S)); read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir); send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
@ -55,20 +54,11 @@ protocol denningSacco-Lowe(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var W: Ticket; var W: Ticket;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const T: TimeStamp; fresh T: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,R ); read_1(I,S, I,R );
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/denning-sacco.spdl
View File

@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ usertype Key;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
usertype TimeStamp; usertype TimeStamp;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -44,20 +43,11 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var W: Ticket; var W: Ticket;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const T: TimeStamp; fresh T: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,R ); read_1(I,S, I,R );
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

21
gui/Protocols/kaochow-v2.spdl
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: SessionKey; var kir,kt: SessionKey;
@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: SessionKey; var kir,kt: SessionKey;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
@ -47,24 +46,10 @@ protocol kaochow-2(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const kir, kt: SessionKey; fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) ); send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

23
gui/Protocols/kaochow-v3.spdl
View File

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
usertype TimeStamp; usertype TimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: SessionKey; var kir,kt: SessionKey;
var T2: Ticket; var T2: Ticket;
@ -33,10 +32,10 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
var kir,kt: SessionKey; var kir,kt: SessionKey;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
const tr: TimeStamp; fresh tr: TimeStamp;
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) ); read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) ); send_3 (R,I, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
@ -51,24 +50,10 @@ protocol kaochow-3(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const kir, kt: SessionKey; fresh kir, kt: SessionKey;
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) ); send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

21
gui/Protocols/kaochow.spdl
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# #
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
var kir: SessionKey; var kir: SessionKey;
var T; var T;
@ -47,24 +46,10 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const kir: SessionKey; fresh kir: SessionKey;
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) ); send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
const te: Ticket;
const ke: SessionKey;
compromised k(Eve,Eve);
compromised k(Eve,Alice);
compromised k(Eve,Bob);
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
compromised k(Alice,Eve);
compromised k(Bob,Eve);
compromised k(Simon,Eve);

20
gui/Protocols/ksl-lowe.spdl
View File

@ -9,24 +9,15 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const a, b, e: Agent;
const s: Server;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);
protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S) protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni, Mi: Nonce; fresh Ni, Mi: Nonce;
var Nc, Mr: Nonce; var Nc, Mr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -48,10 +39,10 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Kbb: TicketKey; fresh Kbb: TicketKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, Ni, I); read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
@ -73,11 +64,10 @@ protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R ); read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
send_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) ); send_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
} }
} }

21
gui/Protocols/ksl.spdl
View File

@ -8,25 +8,15 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const a, b, e: Agent;
const s: Server;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);
protocol ksl(I,R,S) protocol ksl(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni, Mi: Nonce; fresh Ni, Mi: Nonce;
var Nc, Mr: Nonce; var Nc, Mr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -48,10 +38,10 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Kbb: TicketKey; fresh Kbb: TicketKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, Ni, I); read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
@ -73,11 +63,10 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R ); read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) ); send_3(S,R, { Nr, I, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
} }
} }

17
gui/Protocols/needham-schroeder-lowe.spdl
View File

@ -10,16 +10,11 @@
# synchronisation and agreement, because the keys that the server sends # synchronisation and agreement, because the keys that the server sends
# out can be replayed. # out can be replayed.
secret pk: Function; # For some reason SPORE models it such that the agents
# do not know the public keys of the other agents
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S) protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,S, (I,R)); send_1(I,S, (I,R));
@ -34,7 +29,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R)); read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
@ -56,11 +51,3 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
compromised pk(Eve);
compromised pk(Simon); # Needed because of the way SPORE models nsl

14
gui/Protocols/needham-schroeder-sk-amend.spdl
View File

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
secret k: Function;
# Model dec that is invertible by inc # Model dec that is invertible by inc
const dec,inc: Function; const dec,inc: Function;
inversekeys(dec,inc); inversekeys(dec,inc);
@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var T,T2: Ticket; var T,T2: Ticket;
@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,R,I); read_1(I,R,I);
@ -58,17 +57,10 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk-amend(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni,Nr: Nonce; var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
read_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S))); read_3(I,S,(I,R,Ni,{I,Nr}k(R,S)));
send_4(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); send_4(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,Nr,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

13
gui/Protocols/needham-schroeder-sk.spdl
View File

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
# #
secret k: Function;
# Model dec that is invertible by inc # Model dec that is invertible by inc
const dec,inc: Function; const dec,inc: Function;
inversekeys(dec,inc); inversekeys(dec,inc);
@ -18,7 +17,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
@ -35,7 +34,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
read_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S)); read_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
@ -49,15 +48,9 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
read_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni)); read_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
send_2(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); send_2(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

18
gui/Protocols/needham-schroeder.spdl
View File

@ -10,16 +10,11 @@
# synchronisation and agreement, because the keys that the server sends # synchronisation and agreement, because the keys that the server sends
# out can be replayed. # out can be replayed.
secret pk: Function; # For some reason SPORE models it such that the agents
# do not know the public keys of the other agents
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S) protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,S,(I,R)); send_1(I,S,(I,R));
@ -34,7 +29,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R)); read_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
@ -56,12 +51,3 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
compromised pk(Eve);
compromised pk(Simon); # Needed because SPORE only assumes agents know their
# own public key and that of the server

25
gui/Protocols/neumannstub-guttman-hwang.spdl
View File

@ -10,27 +10,20 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang^Repeat(I,R,S) protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang^Repeat(I,R,S)
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
role I role I
{ {
const Mi: Nonce; fresh Mi: Nonce;
var Mr: Nonce; var Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S)); send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir); read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
@ -43,7 +36,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang^Repeat(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Mr: Nonce; fresh Mr: Nonce;
var Tr: TimeStamp; var Tr: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var Mi: Nonce; var Mi: Nonce;
@ -65,7 +58,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
@ -84,9 +77,9 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp; fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni); read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
@ -102,7 +95,7 @@ protocol neustub-GuttmanHwang(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S)); read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));

25
gui/Protocols/neumannstub-guttman.spdl
View File

@ -10,27 +10,20 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S) protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
role I role I
{ {
const Mi: Nonce; fresh Mi: Nonce;
var Mr: Nonce; var Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S)); send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir); read_6(R,I,{Mi,Mr}Kir);
@ -43,7 +36,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Mr: Nonce; fresh Mr: Nonce;
var Tr: TimeStamp; var Tr: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var Mi: Nonce; var Mi: Nonce;
@ -65,7 +58,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
@ -84,9 +77,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp; fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni); read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
@ -102,7 +95,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr); read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);

16
gui/Protocols/neumannstub-hwang.spdl
View File

@ -10,23 +10,15 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const a, b, e: Agent;
const s: Server;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);
protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S) protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni,Mi: Nonce; fresh Ni,Mi: Nonce;
var Nr,Mr: Nonce; var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
@ -48,9 +40,9 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp; fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni); read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
@ -69,7 +61,7 @@ protocol neustub-Hwang(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S)); read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));

25
gui/Protocols/neumannstub-keycompromise.spdl
View File

@ -10,27 +10,20 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S) protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
role I role I
{ {
const Mi: Nonce; fresh Mi: Nonce;
var Mr: Nonce; var Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S)); send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
@ -43,7 +36,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Mr: Nonce; fresh Mr: Nonce;
var Tr: TimeStamp; var Tr: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var Mi: Nonce; var Mi: Nonce;
@ -65,7 +58,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
@ -84,9 +77,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp; fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni); read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
@ -102,7 +95,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr); read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);

26
gui/Protocols/neumannstub.spdl
View File

@ -10,25 +10,17 @@
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey; usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S) protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
role I role I
{ {
const Mi: Nonce; fresh Mi: Nonce;
var Mr: Nonce; var Mr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp; fresh Tr: TimeStamp;
send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S)); send_5(I,R,Mi,{I,Kir,Tr}k(R,S));
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
@ -40,7 +32,7 @@ protocol neustub^Repeat(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Mr: Nonce; fresh Mr: Nonce;
var Tr: TimeStamp; var Tr: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var Mi: Nonce; var Mi: Nonce;
@ -61,7 +53,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
@ -79,9 +71,9 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var Ni,Mi: Nonce; var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Mr: Nonce; fresh Nr,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Tb: TimeStamp; fresh Tb: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I, Ni); read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
@ -96,7 +88,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Ni, Nr: Nonce; var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Tb: TimeStamp; var Tb: TimeStamp;
read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr); read_!2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);

14
gui/Protocols/otwayrees.spdl
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# #
secret const k : Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -15,8 +14,8 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni : Nonce; fresh Ni : Nonce;
const M : String; fresh M : String;
var Kir : SessionKey; var Kir : SessionKey;
send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) ); send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) );
@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
var M : String; var M : String;
const Nr : Nonce; fresh Nr : Nonce;
var Kir : SessionKey; var Kir : SessionKey;
var T1,T2: Ticket; var T1,T2: Ticket;
@ -48,15 +47,10 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
{ {
var Ni,Nr : Nonce; var Ni,Nr : Nonce;
var M : String; var M : String;
const Kir : SessionKey; fresh Kir : SessionKey;
read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) ); read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) ); send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
} }
} }
const Alice, Bob, Eve, Simon: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

18
gui/Protocols/smartright.spdl
View File

@ -10,10 +10,7 @@
# Scyther finds an attack because the value of VoR in te last message can # Scyther finds an attack because the value of VoR in te last message can
# be replaced with an arbitrary value # be replaced with an arbitrary value
const hash: Function; hashfunction hash;
secret unhash: Function;
secret k: Function;
inversekeys (hash,unhash);
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
usertype XorKey; usertype XorKey;
const Vor: XorKey; const Vor: XorKey;
@ -22,9 +19,9 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const VoKey: SessionKey; fresh VoKey: SessionKey;
const VoR: XorKey; fresh VoR: XorKey;
const CW; fresh CW;
var VoRi: Nonce; var VoRi: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {VoKey,{CW}VoR}k(I,R)); send_1(I,R, {VoKey,{CW}VoR}k(I,R));
@ -37,7 +34,7 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var VoR: XorKey; var VoR: XorKey;
var VoKey: SessionKey; var VoKey: SessionKey;
const VoRi: Nonce; fresh VoRi: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {VoKey,T}k(I,R)); read_1(I,R, {VoKey,T}k(I,R));
send_2(R,I, VoRi); send_2(R,I, VoRi);
@ -47,8 +44,3 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;

19
gui/Protocols/splice-as-cj.spdl
View File

@ -12,9 +12,6 @@
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function; const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec); inversekeys (inc,dec);
@ -22,9 +19,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const N1,N2: Nonce; fresh N1,N2: Nonce;
const T: TimeStamp; fresh T: TimeStamp;
const L: LifeTime; fresh L: LifeTime;
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 ); send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
@ -48,13 +45,13 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const N3: Nonce; fresh N3: Nonce;
var N2: Nonce; var N2: Nonce;
var T: TimeStamp; var T: TimeStamp;
var L: LifeTime; var L: LifeTime;
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
@ -67,9 +64,3 @@ protocol spliceAS-CJ(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

21
gui/Protocols/splice-as-hc.spdl
View File

@ -7,9 +7,6 @@
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function; const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec); inversekeys (inc,dec);
@ -17,9 +14,9 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const N1,N2: Nonce; fresh N1,N2: Nonce;
const T: TimeStamp; fresh T: TimeStamp;
const L: LifeTime; fresh L: LifeTime;
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 ); send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
@ -43,13 +40,13 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const N3: Nonce; fresh N3: Nonce;
var N2: Nonce; var N2: Nonce;
var T: TimeStamp; var T: TimeStamp;
var L: LifeTime; var L: LifeTime;
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
@ -62,11 +59,3 @@ protocol spliceAS-HC(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

19
gui/Protocols/splice-as.spdl
View File

@ -12,9 +12,6 @@
usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime; usertype TimeStamp, LifeTime;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
const inc,dec: Function; const inc,dec: Function;
inversekeys (inc,dec); inversekeys (inc,dec);
@ -22,9 +19,9 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const N1,N2: Nonce; fresh N1,N2: Nonce;
const T: TimeStamp; fresh T: TimeStamp;
const L: LifeTime; fresh L: LifeTime;
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 ); send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) ); read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
@ -48,13 +45,13 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const N3: Nonce; fresh N3: Nonce;
var N2: Nonce; var N2: Nonce;
var T: TimeStamp; var T: TimeStamp;
var L: LifeTime; var L: LifeTime;
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
@ -67,9 +64,3 @@ protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);

16
gui/Protocols/tmn.spdl
View File

@ -8,9 +8,6 @@
# from the description in SPORE # from the description in SPORE
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -18,7 +15,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ki: SessionKey; fresh Ki: SessionKey;
var Kr: SessionKey; var Kr: SessionKey;
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) ); send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
@ -31,7 +28,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Kr: SessionKey; fresh Kr: SessionKey;
read_2(S,R, I ); read_2(S,R, I );
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) ); send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
@ -52,12 +49,3 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

20
gui/Protocols/wmf-lowe.spdl
View File

@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ inversekeys (succ,pred);
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
secret k: Function;
protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S) protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Ti: TimeStamp; fresh Ti: TimeStamp;
var Kr: SessionKey; var Kr: SessionKey;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
@ -41,7 +39,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
var Ts: TimeStamp; var Ts: TimeStamp;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) ); read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir); send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
@ -55,7 +53,7 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Ts: TimeStamp; fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
var Ti: TimeStamp; var Ti: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
@ -63,13 +61,3 @@ protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

17
gui/Protocols/wmf.spdl
View File

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ usertype SessionKey;
usertype TimeStamp; usertype TimeStamp;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp; usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -20,8 +19,8 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
const Ti: TimeStamp; fresh Ti: TimeStamp;
var Kr: SessionKey; var Kr: SessionKey;
send_1(I,S, I, {I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S)); send_1(I,S, I, {I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
const Ts: TimeStamp; fresh Ts: TimeStamp;
var Ti: TimeStamp; var Ti: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); read_1(I,S, I,{I, Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
@ -53,13 +52,3 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/woo-lam-pi-1.spdl
View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi1.html # http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi1.html
# #
secret k: Function;
protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S) protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -41,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-1(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/woo-lam-pi-2.spdl
View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi2.html # http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi2.html
# #
secret k: Function;
protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S) protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -41,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-2(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/woo-lam-pi-3.spdl
View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi3.html # http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPi3.html
# #
secret k: Function;
protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S) protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -41,13 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-3(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

12
gui/Protocols/woo-lam-pi-f.spdl
View File

@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPif.html # http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wooLamPif.html
# #
secret k: Function;
protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S) protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -41,11 +39,3 @@ protocol woolamPi-f(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

14
gui/Protocols/woo-lam-pi.spdl
View File

@ -8,8 +8,6 @@
# SPORE. # SPORE.
# #
secret k: Function;
protocol woolamPi(I,R,S) protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
@ -24,7 +22,7 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, I); read_1(I,R, I);
@ -45,13 +43,3 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

18
gui/Protocols/woo-lam.spdl
View File

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
secret k: Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const N1: Nonce; fresh N1: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var N2: Nonce; var N2: Nonce;
@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const N2: Nonce; fresh N2: Nonce;
var N1: Nonce; var N1: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
var T1,T2: Ticket; var T1,T2: Ticket;
@ -53,7 +52,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var N1,N2: Nonce; var N1,N2: Nonce;
read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S)); read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
@ -61,14 +60,3 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: SessionKey;
const Te: Ticket;
const Ne: Nonce;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

10
gui/Protocols/yahalom-ban.spdl
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@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/yahalomBAN.html # http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/yahalomBAN.html
# #
secret k : Function;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -14,7 +12,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -46,7 +44,7 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Ni,Nr: Nonce; var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
@ -54,5 +52,3 @@ protocol yahalom-BAN(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Charlie,David: Agent;

10
gui/Protocols/yahalom-lowe.spdl
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@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
# #
# #
secret k : Function;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
@ -14,7 +12,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -28,7 +26,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -43,7 +41,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Ni,Nr: Nonce; var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
@ -52,5 +50,3 @@ protocol yahalom-Lowe(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;

9
gui/Protocols/yahalom-paulson.spdl
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@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
# #
# #
secret k : Function;
const Fresh: Function; const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function; const Compromised: Function;
@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Ni,Nr: Nonce; var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
@ -55,5 +54,3 @@ protocol yahalom-Paulson(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;

15
gui/Protocols/yahalom.spdl
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@ -5,15 +5,13 @@
# #
# #
secret k : Function;
usertype SessionKey; usertype SessionKey;
protocol yahalom(I,R,S) protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const Ni: Nonce; fresh Ni: Nonce;
var Nr: Nonce; var Nr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -27,7 +25,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
role R role R
{ {
const Nr: Nonce; fresh Nr: Nonce;
var Ni: Nonce; var Ni: Nonce;
var T: Ticket; var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey; var Kir: SessionKey;
@ -41,7 +39,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
role S role S
{ {
const Kir: SessionKey; fresh Kir: SessionKey;
var Ni,Nr: Nonce; var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
@ -52,10 +50,3 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
} }
} }
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);

32
gui/mpa.spdl
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@ -2,19 +2,13 @@
* Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol * Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
*/ */
// PKI infrastructure
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
// The protocol description // The protocol description
protocol nsl3(I,R) protocol nsl3(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
@ -30,7 +24,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
@ -43,30 +37,18 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
/* /*
* Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, * Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol,
* broken version (wrong role name in first message) * broken version (wrong role name in first message)
*/ */
// PKI infrastructure
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
// The protocol description // The protocol description
protocol nsl3-broken(I,R) protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) );
@ -82,7 +64,7 @@ protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
@ -95,9 +77,3 @@ protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

4
gui/ns3.spdl
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );

16
gui/nsl3-broken.spdl
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@ -3,19 +3,13 @@
* broken version (wrong role name in first message) * broken version (wrong role name in first message)
*/ */
// PKI infrastructure
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
// The protocol description // The protocol description
protocol nsl3-broken(I,R) protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) );
@ -31,7 +25,7 @@ protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {ni,R}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
@ -44,9 +38,3 @@ protocol nsl3-broken(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);

16
gui/nsl3.spdl
View File

@ -2,19 +2,13 @@
* Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol * Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
*/ */
// PKI infrastructure
const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
// The protocol description // The protocol description
protocol nsl3(I,R) protocol nsl3(I,R)
{ {
role I role I
{ {
const ni: Nonce; fresh ni: Nonce;
var nr: Nonce; var nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); send_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
@ -30,7 +24,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
role R role R
{ {
var ni: Nonce; var ni: Nonce;
const nr: Nonce; fresh nr: Nonce;
read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) ); read_1(I,R, {ni,I}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) ); send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
@ -43,9 +37,3 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
} }
} }
// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
const Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);