- Moved many old protocols to the misc directory.

spdl/2r890-ex3-a.spdl

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Course 2r890
- *
- * Assignment 0405-3
- *
- * Protocol a
- *
- * nisynch, niagree
- */
-const pk: Function;
-secret sk: Function;
-inversekeys (pk,sk);
-
-protocol course2r890year0405ex3(X,Y,I)
-{
-	role I
-	{
-		const nx: Nonce;
-		const ny: Nonce;
-
-		send_1(I,X, nx );
-		read_2(X,I, { I,nx }sk(X) );
-		send_3(I,Y, ny );
-		read_4(Y,I, { ny,I }sk(Y) );
-
-		claim_i1(I,Niagree);
-		claim_i2(I,Nisynch);
-	}	
-	
-	role X
-	{
-		var nx: Nonce;
-
-		read_1(I,X, nx );
-		send_2(X,I, { I,nx }sk(X) );
-	}
-
-	role Y
-	{
-		var ny: Nonce;
-
-		read_3(I,Y, ny );
-		send_4(Y,I, { ny,I }sk(Y) );
-	}
-}
-
-const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
-
-untrusted Eve;
-const ne: Nonce;
-compromised sk(Eve);
-

spdl/2r890-ex3-b.spdl

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Course 2r890
- *
- * Assignment 0405-3
- *
- * Protocol b
- *
- * not nisynch, but still niagree
- */
-const pk: Function;
-secret sk: Function;
-inversekeys (pk,sk);
-
-protocol course2r890year0405ex3(X,Y,I)
-{
-	role I
-	{
-		const ni: Nonce;
-
-		send_1(I,X, ni );
-		read_2(X,I, { I,ni }sk(X) );
-		send_3(I,Y, ni );
-		read_4(Y,I, { ni,I }sk(Y) );
-
-		claim_i1(I,Niagree);
-		claim_i2(I,Nisynch);
-	}	
-	
-	role X
-	{
-		var nx: Nonce;
-
-		read_1(I,X, nx );
-		send_2(X,I, { I,nx }sk(X) );
-	}
-
-	role Y
-	{
-		var ny: Nonce;
-
-		read_3(I,Y, ny );
-		send_4(Y,I, { ny,I }sk(Y) );
-	}
-}
-
-const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
-
-untrusted Eve;
-const ne: Nonce;
-compromised sk(Eve);
-

spdl/misc/tls-paulson.cpp

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+/*
+ * This is a model of the TLS version as modeled by Paulson
+ *
+ * The .cpp file cannot be fed into scyther directly; rather, one needs
+ * to type:
+ *
+ * 	cpp tls-paulson.cpp >tls-paulson.spdl
+ *
+ * in order to generate a valid spdl file for scyther.
+ *
+ * This allows for macro expansion, as seen in the next part.
+ *
+ */
 #define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
 #define MSG a,na,sid,pa,pb,nb,sid,pb,CERT(a),CERT(b),{pms}pk(b) 
 #define M hash(pms,na,nb)

spdl/nsl3.spdl

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
 		send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
 		read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
 		send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
+
 		claim_i1(I,Secret,ni);
 		claim_i2(I,Secret,nr);
 		claim_i3(I,Niagree);
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
 		read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
 		send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
 		read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
+
 		claim_r1(R,Secret,ni);
 		claim_r2(R,Secret,nr);
 		claim_r3(R,Niagree);
@@ -33,11 +35,9 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
 	}
 }
 
-const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
+const Eve: Agent;
 
 untrusted Eve;
 const ne: Nonce;
 compromised sk(Eve);
 
-run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);
-run nsl3.R(Agent,Agent);

spdl/problems-johanselst.spdl

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-/* 
- * Some authentication protocol
- * 
- * Version by Johan Selst. Seems to segfault at a simple -r4 execution
- * with the modelchecker.
- *
- * Reported on 2005-05-11.
- */
-
-// PKI infrastructure
-
-const pk: Function;
-secret sk: Function;
-inversekeys (pk,sk);
-
-// The protocol description
-
-protocol as3a(X, I, Y)
-{
-	role X
-	{
-		var nix: Nonce;
-
-		read_1(I, X, nix);
-		send_2(X, I, {I,nix}sk(X));
-	}
-
-	role I
-	{
-		const nix, niy: Nonce;
-
-		send_1(I, X, nix);
-		read_2(X, I, {I,nix}sk(X));
-		send_3(I, Y, niy);
-		read_4(Y, I, {niy,I}sk(Y));
-		claim_i1(I, Nisynch);
-	}	
-
-	role Y
-	{
-		var niy: Nonce;
-
-		read_3(I, Y, niy);
-		send_4(Y, I, {niy,I}sk(Y));
-	}
-}
-
-// The trusted agents in the system
-
-const Alice,Bob,Carol: Agent;
-
-// An untrusted agent, with leaked information
-
-const Eve: Agent;
-untrusted Eve;
-compromised sk(Eve);
-
-// The runs (only needed for the modelchecker algorithm)
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-
-run as3a.X(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.I(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-run as3a.Y(Agent,Agent,Agent);
-

spdl/speedtest.spdl

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-const pk: Function;
-secret sk: Function;
-inversekeys (pk,sk);
-
-protocol ns3speedtest(I,R)
-{
-	role I
-	{
-		const ni: Nonce;
-		var nr: Nonce;
-
-		send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
-		read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
-		send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
-		claim_4(I,Secret,nr);
-	}	
-	
-	role R
-	{
-		var ni: Nonce;
-		const nr: Nonce;
-
-		read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
-		send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
-		read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
-		claim_5(R,Secret,ni);
-	}
-}
-
-const Alice,Bob,Eve : Agent;
-
-/* something like this will later on all be implied by 'untrusted Eve' */
-
-untrusted Eve;
-const nc: Nonce;
-compromised sk(Eve);
-
-/* pre-defined 10 runs, limit using --max-runs parameters */
-
-run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Bob);
-	run ns3speedtest.R(Alice,Bob);
-run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Eve);
-	run ns3speedtest.R(Eve,Bob);
-run ns3speedtest.I(Bob,Alice);
-	run ns3speedtest.R(Bob,Alice);
-run ns3speedtest.I(Bob,Eve);
-	run ns3speedtest.R(Eve,Alice);
-run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Alice);
-	run ns3speedtest.R(Bob,Bob);